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Abstract 
This article seeks to understand the dynamics of twenty-first century military        
intervention by the United States and its allies. Based on an analysis of Bush and 
Obama administration policy documents, we note that these wars are new departures 
from previous interventions, calling on the military to undertake post-conflict       
reconstruction in ways that was previously left to indigenous government or to the 
civilian aspects of the occupation. This military-primary reconstruction is harnessed to 
ambitious neoliberal economics aimed at transforming the host country’s political 
economy. Utilizing the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions as case studies, the study 
analyzes the dynamics set in motion by this policy. The key processes are two       
concatenated cycles of military pacification and economic immiseration in discrete 
localities operating through varying paths of causation. Pacification by the military as 
well as subsequent military-primary introduction of neoliberal economic reform    
generates immiseration; locally based resistance. As well as ameliorating efforts aimed 
at reconstructing the old system subsequently generates repacification. Each iteration 
of the cycle deepens the humanitarian crisis, and assures new rounds of local and 
sometimes  national resistance.  
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The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the first comprehensive 
Obama Administration statement of U.S. military policy, articulated 
goals similar to those expressed in its Bush-era predecessor (NSC 
2006). The preface of the NSS promised to extend U.S. influence ‘to 
more countries and capitals,’ in order to shape ‘an international order 
that can meet the challenges of our times.’ In the Middle East, the 
document promised to ‘pursue comprehensive engagement across the 
region’ (NSC 2010, p.ii,1,4). 
 The ambitions expressed in this document are familiar to 
those who listen even casually to the statements of intention by      
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political Washington. They are noteworthy only because the           
document expresses an aspect of military policy that is rarely the focus 
of scholarly analysis: its assumption that the military would play a  
central role in advancing U.S. influence while the shaping 
‘international order,’ and in pursuing ‘comprehensive engagement’ in 
the Middle East.  
 This article will look at the nature of military involvement in 
U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century, in an attempt to        
understand the dynamics and impact of such a military-centered    
foreign policy, assessing its impact on the social and economic    
structure of the countries that become focal points in the effort to 
shape the ‘international order.’ This study considers the social,       
political, and economic processes set in motion by the (attempted) 
enactment of this policy in the Middle East, giving special emphasis to 
the imposition of neoliberal reform as a key component in this      
process; the impact of making the military the centerpiece of         
economic and social reform; and effect of these dynamics on the    
human rights of the target population.  
 
PART I - THE SCHOLARLY CONTEXT OF MILITARY-
CENTERED REFORM 
 The scholarly context for the set of policies that characterized 
U.S. foreign policy in the first decade of the twenty-first century—and 
articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy—can be found in 
the autonomous literatures addressing neoliberalism, military          
intervention, and human rights—all subjects that have been integrated 
under the larger rubric of globalization. 
 Beginning before the fall of the Soviet Union, but amplified 
afterwards, scholars have sought to understand various aspects of 
cross-border relationships as part of globalization. This work has   
often divided the subject into economic, cultural, and political        
dimensions,1 supplemented by more specialized areas that do not     
necessarily fit into these broader categories, such as electronic        
communication, transportation, and migration2.  
 One of the weaknesses in the current globalization literature 
is a relative (but by no means complete) inattention to the connections 
that tie the various elements of globalization together—either through 
reciprocal causation or through the sinews of common origins. There 
2
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has, instead, tended to be separate literatures attending to each of the 
general phenomena, and distinct sub-literatures devoted to the more 
specialized areas3.  
 This study attempts to add to the under-attended connecting 
sinews among these dimensions of globalization, by focusing on three 
specialized areas in the globalization nexus, but which I feel have   
become connected in new ways in the twenty-first century, particularly 
in recent U.S.-led military interventions exemplified by the invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
 The predominance of neoliberalism as the guiding ideology 
and practice of economic globalization. The work in this 
area has focused on the ways in which the       
neoliberal policies of privatization, free trade, and 
deregulation have been both consequences and 
causes of the extension of multinational           
corporations into the core of various countries 
(most notably for our purposes in the global 
south), and the impact of these changes on both 
the international and local economies4. 
 
 Military intervention, usually led by the United States, but 
ordinarily involving a nexus of states, most often         
including representation from the European Union.5 Most 
scholars analyze these interventions under the 
rubric of political globalization, with the military 
action serving the classical Clausewitz             
characterization of ‘politics by other means.’6 
 
 Humanitarian crises, which have been an unfortunately 
common occurrence in the last two decades.7 The work in 
this area has often been fitted into the literature 
on the human rights regimes, consisting of a     
nexus of international legal instruments, United 
Nations institutions, associated human rights    
organizations, and human-rights oriented social 
movements. Work in this area focuses mainly on 
the origins of these crises in terms of the political 
3
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dynamics that characterize the locality, and with 
assessing the efficacy of the international human 
rights regime in reversing human rights violations 
and redressing their consequences.8  
 
Neoliberal Dynamics and Military Intervention  
 Even before neoliberalism had become the chosen (self)   
designation of the guiding economic principle underlying economic 
globalization, its essential elements had caught the attention of some 
scholars. Global Reach, the 1974 best seller by Richard Barnet and 
Ronald Müller (2004) identified the removal of tariff barriers, removal 
of government subsidies, the privatization of government enterprise, 
and the vast expansion of overseas investment by the metropolitan 
money markets as the enabling legislation for the penetration of     
multinational corporations into the economies of what was then called 
‘the Third World’—countries unaligned with the U.S. or Soviet blocs. 
The scholarship since then has refined our understanding of the    
underlying political-economic dynamics that have driven this process, 
focusing analytic attention on the compulsions of late 20th century 
capitalism in determining its impulse and impact.9 
 The work in this area has led to two relevant analyses of the 
changing relationships among politics, military intervention, and    
economics. One set of analyses have focused on what some recent 
scholars have designated the transnational capitalist class (TCC);    
arguing that neoliberal globalization has freed the TCC from the     
traditional constraints of state regulation.10 Bauman succinctly         
summarized the argument: 
  
  Due to the unqualified and unstoppable spread of 
free trade rules, and above all the free movement 
of capital and finances, the ‘economy’ is                         
progressively exempt from political control;               
indeed the prime meaning conveyed by the term 
’economy’ is the area of the non-political 
 (Bauman,1998:66). 
 
 Scholars embracing this tradition have thus expected that the 
flow of investment and the expansion of MNCs has been increasingly 
4
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unfettered by either state intervention, international treaties, and 
(especially) by the actions—including military policy—of host       
governments (Duffield, 2001:47f).  
 A second thrust has looked at the opposite relationship—the 
ability of the TCC to influence various governments—or key elements 
of government—to advance its interest. This second analytic thrust 
has also received considerable attention, pointing toward a variety of 
mechanisms that pressure the various capitalist states to act on behalf 
of the TCC. One focal point of this work has been the role of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions—International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—
usually working through trade agreements or structural adjustment 
loans. These vectors of power and influence typically find expression 
in altered government policies, most often through privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, lowering of trade barriers, and/or elimination 
of state subsidies to domestic industries or citizens, all of which      
facilitate the penetration of local economies by MNCs and/or       
international finance.11 Many analysts see the work of the Bretton 
Woods institutions as extensions of a loose grouping of governments, 
dominated by the United States and populated by several of the G20 
largest economies (Smith 2005; Harvey 2005; Harris 2011; ), and that 
each of the G20 states—especially the U.S. government—acts on  
behalf of the TCC, as David Harvey argues at length (2003). Bauman, 
again, succinctly summarized this connection: ‘the nation-states turn 
more and more into the executors and plenipotentiaries of forces 
which they have no hope of controlling politically’ (Bauman, 1998:65). 
Subcommandante Marcos of the Zapatista movement in Mexico   
articulated an almost identical conclusion in his analysis of neoliberal 
globalization: ‘Where they were once in command of their economies, 
the nation states (and their governments) are commanded—or rather 
telecommanded—by the same basic logic of financial power’ (Marcos, 
1997).  
 Bauman (1998), in elaborating this viewpoint, traces the    
origins of modern military interventionism to the Cold War, which, he 
believes, provided a framework for the military activities of the   
Western and Soviet blocs in the post World War II period, with each 
block establishing a ‘meta-sovereignty’ that allowed for ‘competition 
between groups of states, rather than between the states              
5
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themselves’ (1998:63). This meta-sovereignty, like its single-state        
predecessor, was ‘perched on the ‘tripod’ of military, economic, and 
cultural sovereignties’ (1998:61). Military action, then remained fully 
embedded in the larger political enterprise, a fundamental tool for 
imposing policy both internally (within countries) and externally (but 
within the two contending blocs). There were also occasional,       
spectacular, instances (e.g., Korea, Vietnam) involving areas under 
contention between the blocs. The rhetoric and diplomacy that      
surrounded these actions—internal to the blocs or in disputed 
realms—rested on the logic of Realpolitik (Finnemore 2003;          
Valentino et al. 2004). All these military moments thus constituted, in 
the analyses of scholars, Clausewitzian ‘politics by other means.’  
 The post Soviet era, as Martin Shaw (2001; 2005) has argued, 
was marked by the survival of the Western block along with its the 
propensity for armed intervention (e.g., Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, etc). In 
Shaw’s rendering, the U.S. military has become the dominant element 
in a supra-state military, in which most interventions involve the     
European Union, NATO, and/or Japan, collected together in what he 
calls the ‘Western State’ (or ‘the West’). As the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union faded into the rear-view mirror, the Realpolitik rationale 
also faded, with the ‘military institutions’ that compose this                     
multinational army defined ‘as peacekeepers and agents of             
humanitarian assistance or, more radically, peacemakers, world police 
forces or … war-managers’ (2005:15). In Shaw’s view, and that of 
many other analysts, the role of the military in the globalized world 
continues to be an extension of diplomacy and international relations, 
an aspect of political globalization.12  
 My concern is with a particular subset of this literature that 
understands many of these interventions as extensions of neoliberal 
economic globalization. This understanding finds expression in the 
analyses that see the recent wars, especially the invasion of Iraq, as 
efforts to extend neoliberal policies into new political domains.13    
David Harvey, who called the invasion of Iraq an attempt at ‘violent        
imposition of neo-liberalism’, expressed this viewpoint succinctly 
(2003:216). The draconian measures undertaken by L. Paul Bremer, 
almost immediately after his ascension to leadership of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq, were attempts, in Harvey’s                
interpretation, to ‘do by main force what the U.S. has been trying to 
6
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do globally’ for the previous 30 years.14  
 Immanuel Wallerstein adds texture to this argument by      
analyzing the war as having broader significance than the simple     
imposition of neoliberalism in Iraq, seeing it instead as an attempt to 
halt the political and economic decline of the United States with a 
‘demonstration’ war (2003).  
 Katharine Bjork (2010) developed this logic more fully,      
labeling the war in Iraq as a ‘punitive war.’ In reviewing U.S.           
interventions during the twentieth and twenty-first century, Bjork   
defined punitive wars as an effort to extend sovereignty into          
previously independent (or non-compliant) regions.  
 
  The underlying objective of punitive wars is to 
compel the abandonment of rival sovereignty 
claims and to prepare the way for securing the 
allegiance or just the capitulation of populations 
subjected to punitive actions; and to prepare the 
way for a thoroughgoing imposition of a more 
comprehensive colonial order. (Bjork 2010) 
 
 Such wars are therefore undertaken in ‘situations where not 
only military control is in question, but more fundamentally the moral 
or cultural claims on which sovereignty is premised are at issue.’ 
 In Bjork’s analysis, such wars utilize what she calls 
‘demonstrative or exemplary violence,’ as in the case of the ‘Shock 
and Awe’ campaign in Iraq. This sort of punitive strategy involves 
‘targeting whole communities and ignoring distinctions between   
combatants and civilians,’ and is justified as an effort ‘to discipline, to 
impose order, to ‘pacify’, or even as tutelary, ‘to teach a lesson.’     
Harlan Ullman, the military theorist who developed ‘shock and awe,’ 
offered a similar interpretation by first posing, then answering, his 
own rhetorical question in a British Guardian interview: ‘How do you 
influence the will and perception of the enemy, to get them to behave 
how you want them to? So you focus on things that collapse their 
ability to resist’ (Burkeman, 2003).  
 To illustrate this strategic orientation in the Iraq war as a 
whole, Bjork quotes then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s justification 
for the brutality of the U.S. assault on the insurgent city of          
7
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Falluja: ‘We’ve got to smash somebody’s ass quickly….There has to 
be a total victory somewhere. We must have a brute demonstration of 
power.’ 15 
 This ‘demonstration element’ as critical to punitive war draws 
the analysis back to the globalized neoliberal project. Toby Dodge, in 
three illuminating articles detailing the logic that informed the         
invasion of Iraq, argues that this ‘demonstration’ element applied   
beyond Iraq to the Middle East as a whole. The on-the-ground      
military dimension of the U.S.-led campaign aimed at breaking down 
‘the comparative autonomy from neo-liberal policy’ among Middle 
East countries: 
 
  The autonomy built up by the Baathist regime 
over 35 years of rule allowed it to defy the                    
institutions of the international community and 
resist the application of 13 years of coercive                 
diplomacy. Conversely, if it could be removed, if 
the full force of US military might could be      
displayed in one of the most important states in 
the region, then the rest of the Arab regimes could 
be made to submit fully to US hegemony. (Dodge, 
2006:466-7)16 
 
 This thread of analysis, which originates in the consideration 
of neoliberalism as an expression of the economic stance of the newly 
ascendant transnational capitalist class, and the framework within 
which post-Soviet U.S. foreign policy (and that of its allies) developed, 
leads to framing the military intervention in Iraq—and other recent 
interventions incorporating on-the-ground kinetic military                         
operations—as part of the nexus of neoliberal reform. Dodge’s                
synthesis of punitive war into the tool box for ‘opening’ otherwise 
resistant economies to multinational trade and capital investment   
constitutes an analytic finishing touch for this thread of analysis.  
 These analyses, bringing neoliberal reform into the full      
purview of military goals, provide a dynamic explanation for the   
overarching ideology expressed in the National Security Stategy    
enunciated by Presidents Bush and Obama. At the same time, it stays 
within the boundaries of previous analyses, which view of military 
8
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action as extension of politics. The military role is to overthrow a   
sitting government and enable the establishment of a more congenial 
regime that could or would enact neoliberal economic reforms, among 
many others. In Dodge’s analysis—and that of others sharing his   
orientation—the military’s role remains one of ‘politics by other 
means.’ I will argue later that this role expanded during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars to include a more direct role of the military in     
enacting neoliberal reform.  
 
Human Rights and Military Intervention  
 Humanitarian motivations and justifications for military    
intervention emerged from the conjunction of post-Soviet politics and 
the half-century evolution of what scholars have come to designate as 
the global human rights regime (HRR).17 The founding of the United 
Nations in 1945 initiated an ongoing evolution in the international 
community’s posture toward protecting various populations from  
human rights violations within sovereign countries. Four institutional 
elements comprise the emergent human rights regime: 
 
 Treaties and other international instruments. Starting 
with the UN Charter and the Universal           
Declaration of Human Rights (passed in 1948), 
the legal skeleton of the human rights regime now       
consists of a ‘vast number of international human 
rights instruments’ aimed at general or specific 
rights, sponsored by the United Nations and by 
regional and other groupings of governments 
(Buergenthal 1997:708; Kuperman 2009a).  
 
 The UN system. The establishment of dedicated 
human rights  agencies within and related to the 
UN has proceeded apace during this period, 
aimed at monitoring rights enforcement and          
mobilizing against violations. These include      
generalist bodies such the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and a multitude of specialist    
agencies—including both venerable organizations 
such as UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund) and the 
9
Schwartz: Military Neoliberalism: Endless War and Humanitarian Crisis in th
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
M. Schwartz/Societies Without Borders 6:3 (2011) 190-303 
~199~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011 
ILO (International Labor Organization), and   
recent additions such as UN Women (Donnelly 
1986; Mingst and Karns 2007; UN Women 2011). 
 
 Humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
NGOs have come to play a critical role in        
delivering ameliorative services to human rights 
victims, particularly in crisis areas (including work 
often characterized as reconstruction). While   
important NGOs, for example the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, predated the UN 
Charter, many nodes in this ever-growing        
network, including now familiar agencies such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without    
Borders) and Amnesty International, have       
matured in conjunction with the legal and agency            
infrastructure of the HRR (Mingst and Karns 
2007; Polman 2010; Duffield 2001).  
 
 Social movement organizations (SMOs). Increasingly 
international in scope, SMOs engage in direct  
action aimed at defending or extending human 
rights, usually targeting the policies and actions of 
governments and international formations, while 
invoking the legal and organizational                
infrastructure of the human rights regime.18 
Groups focused on specific issues, such as    
Greenpeace, have formed into globalized      
groupings, most notably the World Social        
Forum.19 
 
 In the early years of its development, the human rights regime 
typically focused on human rights violations associated with           
internecine violence—usually the repressive activities of a predatory 
regime, or the vicious (and often mutual) brutality of civil war. Initial 
UN humanitarian intervention fell into the category of                
peacekeeping: sustaining negotiated cease-fires by placing 
‘peacekeepers’ between contending parties; tasking them with        
10
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preventing renewed violence and human rights violation; and         
mobilizing (largely) NGOs to attend to the needs of the impacted   
civilians. Peacekeeping eventually evolved into ‘peacebuilding,’ in 
which UN personnel (or other international groupings) would insert 
themselves between warring parties in an attempt to create neutral 
territory and eventually dampen the violence. In both cases, the      
intervening parties—even if armed—did not engage in kinetic military 
action. Until the 1990s, then, humanitarian intervention, even when 
conducted by armed military personnel, was essentially non-violent. 
During this period, the high- and low-profile violent interventions—
under the aegis of the UN or undertaken by the Western or Soviet 
blocs—were justified under the Realpolitik rubric (e.g., Korea,       
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Poland).20 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the evolving human rights 
regime migrated toward kinetic military intervention as a necessary 
tool for protecting human rights; this posture would eventually be 
codified as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), defined by the Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State           
Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) in the following way: 
  
  The idea that sovereign states have a responsibility 
to protect their own citizens from avoidable                
catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from          
starvation—but that when they are unwilling or 
unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne 
by the broader community of states. (ICISS,
 2001:viii).  
 
 By the early twenty-first century, when the ICISS codified the 
many aspects of R2P, kinetic military intervention under the banner of 
humanitarian goals had already become a feature of global life, Noam 
Chomsky (2002) had affixed the ironic label of ‘military humanism’ to 
this new form of war, and scholarly literature developed seeking to 
analyze its logic and consequences.  
 Most analysts attributed this shift away from non-violence to 
the failure of many previous peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, 
and to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which ‘broke the logjam in 
the UN Security Council and freed major powers to focus on more 
11
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altruistic objectives’ (Kuperman 2009b).21 Though Finnemore (2003) 
documented military humanism dating back to the nineteenth century, 
and counted the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish     
provinces of Iraq in 1991 by the U.S., Great Britain and France as the 
first instance under the HRR rubric,22 Donnolly (2006), pointed to 
‘the dramatically tragic failure in Rwanda’ in 1994 as the impetus for 
the first full scale military humanism, in Kosovo in 1999: 
 
  As ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kosovo, an ethnically  
Albanian province of Serbia, seemed to be                 
approaching all-out genocide, the United States, 
chastened by its failure in Rwanda, convinced 
NATO to embark on a three-month bombing 
campaign that ultimately led to international     
administrative control over Kosovo’ (Donnelly 
2006:14; see also Kaldor 2006:139). 
 
 Based on case-by-case review of post-Soviet interventions, 
Finnemore concluded that the near-universal presence of human 
rights among the vocabulary of motives flowed from what she called 
‘the coupling of security with human rights’: 
 
  States that abuse citizens in massive or systematic 
ways are now viewed as a security threat both  
because the flows of refugees and social tension 
that such policies create are destabilizing to      
neighbors, and because aggressive behavior               
internally is seen as an indicator of the capacity to 
behave aggressively externally. 23 
 
 Kaldor offered an exemplar of this logic in British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s speech on Kosovo to the Economic Club of 
Chicago: ‘We are all internationalist now whether we like it or not…. 
We cannot turn our back on conflicts and the violation of human 
rights in other countries if we still want to be secure’ (Blair 1999; 
quoted in Kaldor 2006:139-40).  
 The United States has been an animating, often predominant, 
force in many of these interventions, though virtually all were enacted 
12
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under banner of various transnational groupings (Shaw 2005:93f). 
Each has included in its vocabulary of motives forestalling or ending 
humanitarian crisis.24 Examples include: 
  
  Military interventions sponsored by the UN, such 
as the ‘no fly zone’ in Libya in 2011, explicitly   
justified as necessary to prevent mass slaughter of 
peaceful demonstrators in the rebel center of     
Benghazi. 
 
 Interventions by NATO, including the             
decade-long war and occupation in Afghanistan 
(later extended to Pakistan), justified at least in 
part as an effort to end the massive human rights 
violations of the Taliban regime. 
 
 Military actions by ad hoc coalitions, most notably 
the U.S.-created ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invasion 
of Iraq, justified at least in part as intervention to 
definitively end the long history of human rights 
abuses practices by the Hussein regime and/or 
prevent his development and use of WMDs. 
 
  Unilateral military action, including the United 
States drone and rocket attacks in Yemen and   
Pakistan, justified as controlling Al-Qaeda and 
thus preventing further attacks on innocent     
civilians. 
 
 This integration of humanitarianism into the vocabulary of 
motives for kinetic military action is nicely illustrated by President Bill 
Clinton’s justification for NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo: ‘If 
the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop    
genocide and ethnic cleansing’ (Kuperman 2009b:20).  
 A large portion of the analytic literature on military humanism 
(as well as the more restrained peacekeeping and peacebuilding) has 
sought to evaluate the efficacy of these attacks in abating or           
preventing humanitarian violations and crisis.25 In attending to this 
13
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question, the work in this area tends to define success—for both    
military and non-violent forms of intervention—in terms of the  
abatement of existing human rights problems. Most often, this leads 
to a focus on whether the intervention ends existing hostilities or   
preserves a fragile peace, and therefore eliminates the attendant     
human rights crises (such as ethnic cleansing or mass displacement). 
For example, the no-fly zone imposed over the Kurdish areas in Iraq 
in 1991 could be judged a success because the threatened ethnic 
cleansing there did not take place. In Afghanistan in 2001, the      
overthrow of the Taliban could be judged a success because it 
(temporarily) restored a series of human rights for women. 
 Recently this focus has been broadened to include the       
possibility of collateral or unintentional negative impacts on the target 
society. In an important series of studies, Alan Kuperman has pointed 
to what he called ‘perverse unintended consequences,’ in which action 
taken under the rubric of R2P ‘sometimes contributes to the tragedies 
that it intends to prevent’26 (2009b:19,22). Kuperman points             
particularly to the ‘moral hazard’ of military (or non-violent)                 
intervention that protects insurgents in civil wars, since it can either 
‘[prolong] war and the resulting human suffering,’ or ‘[foster] rebellion 
by lowering its expected cost’ (Kuperman 2009a:342; 2009b:22).          
Kuperman’s argument thus asserts an indirect and unintentional    
exacerbation of human rights violations, since the perpetrator is the 
insurgency, rather than the intervening party.  
 While Kuperman and others evaluating the impact of HRR 
consider indirect and unintentional exacerbation of human rights   
violations by humanitarian intervention, a subarea of military         
sociology devoted to understanding the dynamics war in general and 
guerrilla war in particular analyze the direct impact of military        
interventions on civilian well-being,27 most particularly the propensity 
to target large numbers of civilians and thus create massive new       
violations of human rights.28 While this literature is not focused on    
interventions undertaken under the humanitarian rubric, the analyses 
(and examples) encompass them.29 Three important contributions to 
this literature offer quantitative evaluations of the prevalence of        
human rights violations by intervening powers. Alexander Downes 
reported that one-third of interstate wars have included what he calls 
‘civilian victimization,’ defined as ‘a wartime strategy that targets and 
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kills (or attempts to kill) noncombatants’ (Downes 2006:152,154).30 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft, found that about a fifth of all guerrilla wars 
fought since 1950 involved ‘barbarism,’ defined as ‘systematic         
violation of the laws of war,’ typically ‘depredations against             
noncombatants (viz., rape, murder, and torture).’31 Benjamin                       
Valentino and his colleagues documented ‘the intentional killing of 
large numbers of civilians’ as a common feature of state action against 
guerrilla movements, concluding that a fifth of the guerrilla wars since 
1945 resulted in more than 50,000 non-combatant deaths 
(2004:377,397). Though  these studies lack methodological                      
consistency they nevertheless document the frequency of human 
rights violations as direct and deliberate consequence of interstate war, 
and especially those involving guerrilla insurgencies, whether or not 
the intervention is (partially or wholly) animated by human rights       
considerations. 32 
 This consideration is, however, raised by Kate Nash (2011); 
pointing to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo as instances in which the 
intervening countries themselves committed ‘human rights abuses’ in 
violation of ‘wide-ranging international law’ in the process of         
attempting to deter, dislodge, or overthrow an entrenched              
government. In these (and other) instances, Nash points to the failure 
of the human rights regime to restrain the intervening powers: ‘In 
large part [these violations are] due to the way wealthy and influential 
states and IGOs [International Government Organizations]               
co-operate with rather than condemn’ these actions’ (Nash, 2011).33 
 Finnemore raises yet another dimension of the impact of   
humanitarian intervention on the host society, one fraught with the 
possibility of fresh human rights abuses. She points to a unique aspect 
of these interventions, flowing from the necessity of pushing well   
beyond the ‘stopping killing’ tasks of pre-Soviet interventions with 
humanitarian components. Humanitarian interventions must          
undertake ‘nation building’ designed to prevent a renewal of the     
security-threatening human rights abuses in the host countries: 
 
  Intervention in these places now occurs not  
simply with the aim of stopping killing, ... but       
instead has the mission of reconstructing entire 
states and society in ways that did not occur in 
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previous periods of history. Interventions in failed 
states are no longer simply military affairs in 
which killers are disarmed and, if necessary,              
replaced in government by a new set of rulers. 
These interventions now involve a wide range of 
nonmilitary components involving reconstruction 
and social services, mostly provided by                      
international organizations, aimed at overhauling 
war-torn society and remaking them in accordance 
with the normative preferred liberal democratic 
model. (2003:136) 
 
 Without naming it, Finnemore is gesturing at the involvement 
of the full human rights regime in such interventions, and appreciates 
that such efforts are fraught with the possibility of failure: ‘Simply 
handing over the reins of government to a new group is relatively 
easy, and intervenors have been doing this for centuries. Insuring 
broad social reorganization is much harder.’34 
 Astri Suhrke (2007; 2008) analyzes and illustrates negative 
human rights consequences that can emanate from such an            
encompassing endeavor. Focusing on the period following the fall of 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, Suhrke reaches this 
conclusion: 
 
  The conflation of post-war reconstruction with a 
broader agenda of development and                         
modernization has brought out a wide range of 
tensions associated with social change.                    
Simultaneously the prominent foreign role in the          
undertaking has increasingly had negative effects. 
As a result, the entire project shows signs of               
severe contradictions that are adding to the                  
problems caused by the growing insurgency 
(2007:1291-2). 
 
 In Surhke’s analysis, these ‘severe contradictions’ produce 
‘destructive forms of development,’ flowing mainly from an effort to 
engineer ‘a near total overhaul of the country’s polity, economy and 
16
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol6/iss3/3
M. Schwartz/Societies Without Borders 6:3 (2011) 190-303 
~206~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011 
society,’ and ultimately becoming key causal factors in, among other 
human rights problems, the displacement of tens of thousands of  
Afghans. (2007:1293,1299).  
 Surhke’s analysis presses beyond Finnemore’s cautionary 
overarching insight into the social and economic scope of              
humanitarian intervention; she locates the key problems in             
Afghanistan in the concatenation of human rights intervention and 
neoliberal economic reform (see also Tirman 2011:272-6). With the 
military a central actor in engineering all these transformations, human 
rights crises become a product of the process  
 Taken together, we see the unfinished outlines of a           
convergence between the literature on neoliberal globalization and the 
studies of the globalized human rights regime. Both trace an evolution 
in policy that migrated toward military intervention as a key vehicle 
for vast institutional, cultural and economic changes in countries 
which are deemed to be outside either the realm of neoliberal        
economic globalization or the norms of the human rights regime. At 
the same time, both literatures posit strong tendencies for military 
intervention to degrade both human rights and economic health,   
rather than provide a foundation for upgrading social and economic 
prosperity. This study seeks to give more precision to these            
relationships, taking into account the complex processes operating in 
these situations.  
 
PART II - UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
IN THE TIME OF OBAMA 
 We begin by considering the articulated policy of the United 
States, as expressed by the National Security Strategy quoted above, 
and other official documents. We will find a tight fit between the          
literature on military intervention and the explicit goals of the U.S. 
government in Iraq and Afghanistan, and—more generally—in the 
Middle East as a whole.  
 
The Military as a Political-Economic Weapon 
 In April of 2009, General David Petraeus, the newly         
appointed leader of U.S. military in the Middle East, delivered his   
regularly scheduled and routine testimony to the Armed Services  
committees of both the House and Senate (Petraeus 2009). The report 
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was nevertheless noteworthy because it was the first such statement of 
policy by a high ranking official of the newly installed administration 
of President Barack Hussein Obama. Its routine-ship allowed the   
public to discern key elements and motives of U.S. foreign policy that 
were unaltered by the change in chief executives. In this respect, it 
presaged the substance of Obama’s then-pending National Security 
Strategy quoted above.  
 Petraeus began his presentation by describing the ‘area of 
responsibility’ (AOR) for his command, officially known as the United 
States Central Command (CENTCOM): 
 
  The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span 
several critical and distinct regions. Stretching across more 
than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the AOR 
contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the 
Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian 
Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez 
 Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz…. 
The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the world’s most 
energy-rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and               
Central Asia together accounting for at least 64 percent of 
the world’s petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil 
production, and 46 percent of its natural gas reserves 
(Petraeus 2009, emphasis added). 
 
 What might be surprising in this introductory paragraph was 
that Petraeus did not choose to describe his AOR in terms of the  
military challenges that it presented. He did not choose to introduce 
this region as an epicenter of violent conflict for the past five decades 
and—for many years—called ‘the arc of instability’ by U.S.            
government and military officials; nor did he choose to introduce it as 
the focal point of the ‘war on terror’ initiated in 2001 by the George 
W. Bush administration; and he did not choose to describe it as the 
prime source of safe havens from which ‘Islamic extremists’ could 
launch attacks on the U.S. and its allies.  
 Instead, he chose to introduce his AOR in terms of its      
economic and commercial role in the globalized world. The emphasis 
in Petraeus’ characterization of his AOR was the region’s mineral 
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wealth (as the ‘the world’s most energy-rich region’); and its         
commercial importance (since it contained ‘vital transportation and 
trade routes,’ including ‘strategic maritime choke points.’). That is, 
Petraeus’ altogether routine presentation treated the marriage of    
military and economic concerns as altogether routine; and he         
designated the U.S. military as an instrument for protecting the       
interests of dominant economic forces in the globalized economy.  
 It is the intimacy of this military-economic marriage that    
extends the role of the military beyond its traditional position as 
‘politics by other means.’ The scholarship reviewed above             
conceptualizes military intervention—even when its intention contains 
an economic component—as focused on either changing              
governments or forcing changes in government policy. In the various 
scholarly perspectives—and in the reality of the twentieth century—
economic goals pursued by military means were expected to be      
fulfilled by a two-step process: military action impacts on the nature 
of government and its policies, and then the altered government     
policies enact a new economic reality. The imagery in Petraeus’ 
presentation (and in predecessor and subsequent twenty-first century 
documents) implies—in addition to traditional coercion of state     
policy—direct action by the U.S. military to accomplish economic 
objectives—for example to prevent blockage of ‘strategic maritime 
choke points’35 
 A more vivid expression of this marriage of military and    
economic concerns was contained in the June 2010 reports from   
Afghanistan that scientific surveys had documented the presence of 
approximately one trillion dollars in accessible mineral wealth (Risen 
2010; Peter 2010). Since this discovery had occurred several years  
earlier, journalists began querying the timing of the announcement, 
concluding that the late announcement was aimed at reversing the 
declining support for the war there. As BBC analyst Jill McGivering 
put it: ‘at a time of growing despair about Afghanistan and its        
government, the portrayal of the country as a potential goldmine 
could help to bolster international resolve and paint the country as a 
prize worth fighting for.’ (Quoted in Peter 2010; see also Lobe 2010b) 
 This characterization of Afghanistan was expressive of the 
underlying logic that characterizes U.S. policy in general, and the goals 
of the Centcom command in particular: that the capture, control, and 
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extraction of mineral and other economic resources—and making 
them available to the globalized economy—were legitimate, even    
routine, military objectives. Indeed, the presence of such mineral   
resources should be (and hopefully would be) a justification for     
continued and perhaps amplified military action aimed at integrating 
Afghan resources into the globalized economy. (Though the BBC  
report did not make it clear, the projected military role in developing 
these natural resources extended well beyond the traditional role of 
influencing Afghan government policy.)  
 
The Protection of U.S. Influence  
 In his presentation, General Petraeus did eventually mention 
the more traditional military challenges that one might have expected 
to be the centerpiece of his description of his command, but even in 
this context, he reiterated this military marriage to political economy. 
For example, he began his brief review of the ‘Most Significant 
Threats to US Interests,’ with this passage: 
 
  The most serious threats to the United States, its 
allies, and its interests in the CENTCOM AOR lie 
at the nexus of transnational extremists, hostile 
states, and  weapons of mass destruction. Across 
the AOR, Al- Qaeda and its extremist allies are 
fueling insurgency to reduce US  influence and to 
destabilize the existing political, social, and               
economic order.  (2009:7) 
 
 In this passage, while mentioning Al Qaeda, transnational 
extremists, and hostile states, Petraeus did not emphasize the use of 
these ‘hostile states’ as safe havens; he did not mention their use by 
‘transnational extremists’ as a resource for attacking the United States 
or its allies. In fact, the entire 10,000 word presentation to Congress 
made no mention of the threat of such attacks.  
 Instead, Petraeus emphasized the possibility that a           
combination of Al Qaeda, hostile states and WMDs could ‘reduce 
U.S. influence’ in the region and/or ‘destabilize the existing political, 
social and economic order.’ This emphasis fit nicely with his initial 
description of his AOR, in which he had neglected to express concern 
20
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol6/iss3/3
M. Schwartz/Societies Without Borders 6:3 (2011) 190-303 
~210~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011 
about preventing attacks on the U.S. or its allies, emphasizing instead 
the importance of maintaining access to the ‘vital transportation and 
trade routes’ in the ‘the world’s most energy-rich region.’ 
 
Regional Ambitions 
 In addition to these defensive measures aimed at protecting 
the status quo, Petraeus also outlined the more expansive positive 
goals that his command would pursue, evoking the ambition of     
integrating the countries in his AOR into what he called a ‘network of 
cooperation,’ utilizing a ‘whole of government approach that fully 
integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of our allies 
and partners’ (2009:13-14). He summarized these ambitions thusly: 
 
  A model characterized by a focus on common 
interests, inclusivity, and capacity-building can 
best advance security and stability in the region. 
This network of cooperation is both effective 
and sustainable because it creates synergies and, as 
it grows, strengthens relationships. Each              
cooperative endeavor is a link connecting        
countries in the region, and each adds to the               
collective strength of the network. The       
mechanisms put in place to coordinate efforts in 
one area, such as piracy, smuggling, or littoral  
security, can often be leveraged to generate 
 action in other areas, such as a rapid response 
to a major oil spill in the Gulf or in the                 
aftermath of a typhoon or earthquake.          
Moreover, progress made in generating                    
cooperation in a set of issues can serve as an 
opening for engagement on other issues, 
thereby promoting greater interdependence. As 
a result, a growing network not only works to  
improve interoperability and overall effectiveness 
in providing security; it also builds trust and               
confidence among neighbors and partners.36  
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 While this was certainly a mundane recitation of familiar   
nostrums about the Middle East, its familiarity underscores the degree 
to which Washington policy rhetoric was infused with an assumption 
that the United States would be active in the daily life of the region. 
Unlike the typical scholarly vision of military intervention yielding 
political change and prompt withdrawal, Petraeus’ reference to a 
‘network of cooperation’ assumed the United States—and the U.S. 
military—as an ongoing actor in the region. His promise of a ‘rapid 
response to a major oil spill … or a typhoon or earthquake,’ assumed 
activities far from narrow military concerns; and his expectation that 
‘cooperation in a set of issues can serve as an opening for engagement 
on other issues’ assumed an enduring broad based involvement of the 
military in diverse aspects of Middle Eastern society. 37 
 
Transforming the Middle East 
 Petraeus was not saying anything new or controversial. These 
visions and ambitions for the United States as a primary and          
permanent player in the ongoing political and economic life of the 
region had been an evolving aspect of Washington’s foreign policy 
even before the end of the Cold War.38 What Petraeus’ testimony      
articulated was a new and more central role for kinetic military action 
in pursuit of these goals, an innovation of the Bush Administration 
that would continue without pause or scrutiny into the Obama      
presidency. Petraeus was summarizing the more explicit expression of 
the same perspective, codified in President George W. Bush’s        
National Security Strategy of 2006, the predecessor of Obama’s NSS 
four years later (NSC, 2006). That document included nine ‘essential 
tasks’ assigned to the United States military: 
 
 Champion aspirations for human dignity; 
 
 Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to 
prevent attacks against us and our friends; 
 
 Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 
 
 Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our 
friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
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 Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free 
markets and free trade; 
 
 Expand the circle of development by opening societies and 
building the infrastructure of democracy; 
 
 Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main 
centers of global power;  
 
 Transform America’s national security institutions to meet 
the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; 
and 
 
 Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of 
globalization. 
 
 Only three of these ‘essential tasks’ were military; the six    
others were broader— encompassing humanitarian, political, and   
economic ambitions. These broader concerns fit all-too-neatly into the 
trend toward military humanism codified by various scholars (see 
above, Part I). The promise, by a commanding general, to ‘champion 
aspirations for human dignity,’ by ‘opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy,’ and by expanding ‘free markets and free 
trade’ implied the centrality of military action in fostering               
encompassing social and economic transformation under the banner 
of humanitarianism. This vision fit neatly with scholarly viewpoints 
reviewed in Part I, including analysts of both humanitarian              
intervention and neoliberal expansion.  
 Particularly noteworthy was the emphasis on ‘opening 
[Middle East] societies’ to the ‘the circle of development,’ and thus 
igniting ‘a new era of global economic growth through free markets  
and free trade.’39 While in part a simple restatement of the U.S.        
government’s 40 year commitment to globalized neoliberalism, it also 
expressed the recent concatenation of military intervention with    
neoliberalization (see below).  
 In the 2006 document, the National Security Council dwelled 
on these economic goals, asserting them as fundamental to ‘extending 
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liberty and prosperity’ in the world as a whole. The three elements 
mentioned in this context were: 
 
 Opening markets and integrating developing countries….  
 
 Opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to 
ensure energy independence…. 
 
 Reforming the International Financial System to ensure 
stability and growth. 
 
 For the Middle East, the goal of ‘opening markets’ was    
therefore fundamental: ‘We seek a Middle East of independent states, 
at peace with each other, and fully participating in an open global  
market of goods, services, and ideas.’  
 This familiar idea of ‘opening markets’ contains the           
assumption of economic transformation, especially when applied to 
the Middle East, where accomplishing such an ‘opening’ would     
require a profound and fundamental change in the way these countries 
conducted their economic, social and political life.40 What is notable 
here is that until 2001 successful (and unsuccessful) efforts at ‘opening 
markets’ and introducing the full range of neoliberal reforms had been 
undertaken through the economic globalization process—notably  
direct investment by the transnational capitalist class, leverage by the 
Bretton Woods institutions, and ample political pressure from core 
countries in the world system, most notably the United States. The 
2006 NSS—and Petraeus’ 2009 testimony that embraced it—
presented a substantially amplified role for the military in this         
neoliberal process, making the military the centerpiece of this        
economic process, at least in the Middle East.  
 In the body of his testimony, Petraeus spoke only briefly 
about each of the countries in the region under his command. His 
comments on Afghanistan lent substance to his more general        
concerns, assuring Congress that the military campaigns there would 
be ‘integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic 
development’ (Petraeus 2009:24). As a prime example of how he 
would apply this broader plan, Petraeus pledged to develop a new  
agricultural regime to replace opium, the country’s largest cash crop 
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which, in 2009 accounted for over 50% of the Afghan economy 
(McCoy 2010). Here is his description of this goal: 
 
  Another major component of our strategy is to 
disrupt narcotics trafficking, which has provided 
significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This 
drug money has been the ‘oxygen in the air’ that 
allows  these groups to operate. With the recent 
extension of authority granted to  US forces to 
conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are                 
better able to work with the Afghan government 
more  closely to eradicate illicit crops, shut down 
drug labs, and disrupt trafficking networks. To 
complement  these efforts, we will also promote 
viable agricultural alternatives, build Afghan law 
enforcement capacity, and develop the                           
infrastructure to help Afghan farmers get their 
products to market. (2009:23-4) 
 
 This program points to the fundamental contradiction   
pointed out by Surhke (2007; 2008) that is intrinsic to comingling  
military, economic, and political ambitions. The destruction of opium 
cultivation—presented by Petraeus as a new but essential part of the 
military campaign against the Taliban—would also deprive a plurality 
of Afghan farmers, merchants, and others of their chief source of   
income. He proposed to remedy this economic calamity by            
engineering an agricultural revolution. The troops under his command 
would construct, from the ground up, a new agricultural economy 
together with a political infrastructure to support it. In asserting these 
lofty goals, Petraeus was thus incorporating the neoliberal agenda into 
the military’s goals and responsibility, since this agricultural revolution 
would involve (in practice as well as theory—see below) opening these 
local areas to world markets (through purchase of supplies, sales of 
products, and—where relevant—foreign investment).  
 For Afghanistan, then, the U.S. role, as described by     
CENTCOM commander Petraeus, would be revolutionary, with U.S. 
personnel—military at first, civilian later—embedding themselves in 
local communities and transforming the lives of the residents. The 
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military would, in fact, ‘take a residential approach and, in a culturally 
acceptable way, live among the people, understand their               
neighborhoods, and invest in relationships.’ Petraeus succinctly     
summarized this transformative strategy as ‘building, not rebuilding.’ 
In enunciating the principle, he implicitly acknowledged the vast     
destruction of existing social and economic infrastructure (which 
would not be rebuilt), while promising a brand new social system 
(which would be built).  
 Even the neoliberal and military theorists who have          
appreciated the economic motives and the destructiveness of twenty-
first century interventions have not appreciated the full scope of     
military ambitions. These theorists have looked at military action as 
targeted against states and their policies, with economic and social 
construction the responsibility of new or reformed governments. In 
the Bush and Obama administrations this historic division of labor 
has been superceded by transferring the agency of economic           
revolution from the indigenous state to the occupying army. At the 
same time, this broadened initiative fits neatly into the decades-long 
effort to spread neoliberalism to the farthest (and often most         
insulated) regions of the Middle East (and the world).41 
 
A Robust Civilian Presence in Iraq 
 In discussing his mandate in Iraq, where the project was 
much further along than in Afghanistan, Petraeus focused on         
sustaining the U.S. presence there, thus revealing yet another          
dimension of the military-primacy policy that sets off twenty-first    
century intervention. While promising the orderly withdrawal of U.S. 
troops by the promised December 2011 deadline,42 he included a     
familiar caveat about the fragility of the situation: 
 
  Though the trends in Iraq have been largely                
positive, progress has been uneven, and the                 
situation remains fragile and reversible. A return 
to violence remains an option for those who have 
set aside their arms. Enemy organizations,                  
especially Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian-
backed Shi’a extremist groups, remain committed 
to narrow sectarian agendas and the expulsion of 
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US influence from Iraq (2009:29). 
 
 For Petraeus, then, the fragility in Iraq lay in the possibility 
that ‘enemy organizations’ would accomplish ‘the expulsion of US 
influence.’ In light of this, the military took as its goal—even while it 
withdrew its troops—the preservation of U.S. influence in the      
country.43 This would include Iraq’s integration into the ‘network of 
cooperation’ that was his ultimate goal for the region, but also        
consolidating the partnership with Iraq inside the country, where   
influence would be maintained by an amplified civilian presence.  
 Even before the Petraeus testimony in summer of 2009, the 
commitment to a strong U.S. influence in Iraq was translated into 
practice by the increasingly high profile there of the U.S. State        
Department and other non-military U.S. agencies. The embassy     
compound, built to accommodate 1000 state department officials, and 
completed at a cost of over $600 million, was the largest embassy in 
world history when it opened in late 2008. (In 1900, when 
300,000,000 people lived in the English colonial domain                
encompassing modern Indian, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
the total British administrative force was considerably smaller.) This 
construction was, by itself, a clear signal that the Bush administration 
sought to sustain U.S. ‘influence’ long after the troops withdrew 
(Schwartz 2008:207; USBIA 1906).  
 The 2008 presidential election in the United States transferred 
to the Obama administration the task of defining and implementing 
the transition from a military occupation to what Obama himself 
would describe as a ‘robust civilian presence.’ The willingness to    
administer the Bush mandate was soon clear enough: by late summer 
2009, the embassy staff had swelled to 1873 officials from 10 different 
U.S. government departments, far exceeding the residential or office 
capacity of the new embassy complex. This massive expansion       
generated considerable ambivalence about ‘rightsizing.’ A State      
Department investigation expressed both sides of the controversy, 
pointing out, on the one hand, that ‘Given the high priority placed on 
Iraq and the policy of the previous administration to encourage all 
relevant agencies to send employees to the embassy…many of the 
normal limits on staffing have not been imposed,’ while, on the other 
hand, concluding that ‘the time has come for a significant rightsizing.’ 
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The recommendation to return to the original staffing levels would, 
the report averred, allow the Embassy ‘to carry out its mission in 
Iraq’ (quoted in Strobel 2009). 
 This mission, as defined by the Obama team, was not       
restricted to an advisory role to various agencies in the Iraqi          
government. Despite the NSS promise of a transition to ‘full Iraqi 
sovereignty and responsibility’, the progressively civilianized U.S.    
presence adopted instead a ‘hands on’ approach (NSC 2010:4). United 
States officials took the initiative in both developing and                 
implementing the policies that would fulfill the administration’s    
promise to transform the country into a full participant in the 
‘network of coordination’ envisaged in Petraeus’ testimony.  
 A centerpiece of this activist orientation was the creation of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, described by Associated Press   
reporter Warren Strobel (2009) as ‘the prime U.S. tool for rebuilding 
civilian life in Iraq’s provinces.’ These teams were tasked with entering 
small or medium sized communities, assess their needs, recruit       
necessary resources and labor, and oversee the process to its          
successful conclusion. This work could include anything from job 
creation and sewage systems to police training and constructing a local       
government.  
 The military was expected to tightly coordinate with the 
PRTs, protect them as well as engage in the active work of the teams. 
In areas without PRTs, the military engaged in its own initiatives, 
aimed at establishing the foundation for integrating Iraqi society into 
the global system. In the spirit of what has become formally known as 
Counterinsurgency Warfare, CENTCOM troops in Iraq (and also  
Afghanistan) were instructed to ‘clear, hold, and build’ in the        
communities they entered.44 That is, after utilizing normal military 
means to oust insurgents from the community, they were expected to 
shift their work from mainly ‘kinetic’ activities (involving the use of 
lethal force) to ‘non-kinetic’ activities (Allam 2009). During the       
transition from kinetic to non-kinetic missions, the military relied  
increasingly on its Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 
which provided financing for ‘water, electrical or agricultural projects 
and other emergency needs’ (Morrison 2009). Utilizing this fund, the 
units would, often in cooperation with State Department PRT units, 
assess local needs and implement plans to address them.  
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 Very frequently, U.S. contractors were hired to implement the 
local projects initiated by the PRTs or by the military. International 
Relief and Development, a Virginia-based non-profit, for example, 
recieved a $644 million contract, tasked with ‘paying Iraqis cash to do 
public works projects such as trash removal and ditch digging.’ (This 
program was later discontinued because it had drowned in a sea of 
corruption that led to meager public works, and because too many of 
the jobs were given to mythical employees instead of local residents 
(Dilanian 2009).) By summer of 2009, the number of contractors    
employed by U.S. agencies working out of the embassy had risen to 
13,000 (Strobel 2009). 
 This multipronged approach to the ‘robust civilian presence’ 
fully expressed the long term perspective on the U.S. presence, which 
imagined and enacted the United States as a key agent in developing 
and then implementing plans for the future structure and functioning 
of Iraqi society, with the military—for the short and medium term—
at the center of this nexus of institutions.  
 The emergent policy expressed by these commitments and 
actions involved ‘shared sovereignty,’ an innovative new policy       
proposed by Stephen Krasner, Director of Policy Planning at the 
United States Department of State from 2005 to 2007: 
 
  Shared sovereignty would be a promising addition 
to the available set of policy options. Shared-
sovereignty entities are created by a voluntary 
agreement between recognized national political 
authorities and an external actor such as another 
state or a regional or international organization. 
Such arrangements can be limited to specific issue 
areas like monetary policy or the management of 
oil revenues (2005:70).45  
 
 Shared sovereignty became a third element in the projected 
role for the U.S. military (and the associated civilian agencies) in Iraq 
(and, subsequently, in Afghanistan): in partnership with the state     
department and other government and private agencies, the military 
was tasked with establishing a new kind of joint governance (with the 
newly installed client government) over various projects that would 
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work to dismantle destroyed or dysfunctional elements of the existing 
social and economic structure while constructing a new system      
designed to fit into neoliberal globalization.  
 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Bundt, the Deputy Health 
Attaché to the US Embassy in Baghdad during 2009-2010, expressed 
this tripartite responsibility—dismantling the old structures, building a 
new structure, and sharing sovereignty—in his detailed plan for a new 
medical system in Iraq. Bundt worked ‘directly with the [Iraqi] Minster 
of Health on the first implemented health policy since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom began.’ The resulting document detailed ‘the challenges we 
face in planning, implementing, and sustaining a viable health care 
policy in Iraq’ (Bundt, 2010). In introducing his work, Bundt stated: 
 
  Following combat operations and phasing into 
stabilization operations, basic health care                      
infrastructure and systems have often been either 
disrupted or degraded altogether. To address this 
situation, the U.S. Government requires a                      
coordinated interagency approach to formulate a 
 strategic health care plan. Incorporating all                    
relevant players into this endeavor will promote 
sound organizational design, unity of effort, and a 
culture favorable to synchronization. This paper 
contains specific recommendations and advocates 
a renewed effort toward addressing them. The 
primary constructs under review are U.S.                 
Government organization, leadership, and culture 
as they relate to a strategic health care policy. This 
approach will reduce redundant efforts, conserve 
resources, and augment the legitimacy of the new 
Government of Iraq while supporting U.S.               
national strategic aims.’ 
 
 What is striking about this text was how it express the full 
range of new responsibilities shouldered by the U.S. military (and  
associated civilian agencies) in Iraq. 
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 That the United States had taken the initiative to 
‘formulate’ a plan for a new health care system in 
Iraq, and that this effort would ultimately               
incorporate ‘all relevant players,’ including a                
number of U.S. agencies and, at some point, the 
Iraqis themselves, is a perfect illustration of          
Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty.46 
 
 Bundt’s comment that the pre-existing (and once 
very   effective) medical system in Iraq had been 
‘either disrupted or degraded altogether,’ signals 
the typical by-product (or goal) of intervention, 
resulting in the destruction of existing structures 
(in this case a free state-run-and-financed hospital 
system). 
 
 The newly designed system proposed by Bundt fit         
comfortably into the neoliberal framework,          
including a full measure of private enterprise and a 
very limited role for the Iraqi government and its 
‘degraded’ state-run hospital  system. 
 
 The assignment of Bundt as the key planner of 
this program (in partnership with the Iraqi                    
Minister of Health) is symptomatic of the                   
centrality of the military in creating the foundation 
for this new initiative in the health care sector, and 
pregnant with the expectation that the military 
would continue to play an essential role, even as it 
was expected to withdraw completely by the end 
of 2011. 
 
 This expectation of withdrawal, which was still in doubt in             
mid-summer 2011, presented considerable problems for U.S. planners 
in the medical and other areas in which shared sovereignty was       
expected to extend beyond December 2011, and in which a military 
presence was required. In Spring of 2010, the U.S. State Department, 
slated to be handed the primary role that the Defense Department 
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had played in the first eight years of the war, enunciated two strategies 
to manage this problem, if indeed the U.S. military did withdraw as 
scheduled.  
 First, the State Department requested substantial resources to 
fund a dramatic expansion of its own military force, the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security. The Associated Press reported the request thusly: 
 
  The State Department says its diplomatic staff 
won't be safe after the American military leaves 
Iraq unless it has its own combat-ready protection 
force, a warning that   underscores concerns about 
the Iraq army and police the U.S. has spent           
billions of dollars training and equipping. 
 
  Vehicles and aircraft used by the department's 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security to protect                    
personnel in other parts of the world are 
‘inadequate to the extreme security challenges in 
Iraq,’ according to documents the State                          
Department sent to the Pentagon in April. The 
bureau will need to ‘duplicate the capabilities of 
the U.S. military’ by December 2011, the                       
documents say, when all American forces are 
scheduled to leave Iraq. 
 
  The State Department wants 24 of the Army's 
Black Hawk helicopters, 50 bomb-resistant                 
vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers and high-
tech surveillance systems, according to the               
documents, which were obtained by The               
Associated Press (Lardner 2010).  
 
 The long term perspective of the State Department expressed 
in these plans underscored the commitment not only to a pervasive 
U.S. influence throughout Iraqi society, but also that military          
personnel would be essential to the vast projects that the 1000 U.S. 
officials, the tens of thousands of U.S. based contractors, and the   
multitude of others (including some Iraqis) who would be employed 
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or involved in enacting their plans.47  
 At this same moment, the State Department announced a 
second plan, to replace its PRTs with five ‘Enduring Presence Posts,’ 
a set of satellite compounds in various parts of the country,          
commanding the local programs, and therefore alleviating the pressure 
on the overcrowded embassy in Baghdad. Their plan was based on 
taking over the existing facilities and equipment used by the military 
(including, perhaps, their five ‘enduring’ military bases scheduled to be 
abandoned in December of 2011), since the alternative would be to 
develop ‘a massive new life support infrastructure throughout Iraq.’ 
These facilities would be protected by private security personnel, thus 
providing a second (mercenary) force to operate in place of the     
departing soldiers and marines (Lardner 2010; Ackerman 2011). 
 During its first 18 months in office, the Obama                 
administration’s commitment to ongoing ‘influence’ in Iraq took 
shape as a powerful, resourceful presence ‘throughout Iraq,’          
headquartered by the huge embassy in Baghdad, populated with ample 
administrators capable of overseeing the work of at least 10 federal 
agencies, to be supervised in the future by five ‘enduring presence 
posts’ judiciously placed to reach into the various regions of the    
country, and already or eventually extending into myriad small       
communities, middle-sized towns and larger cities, where U.S.       
government teams and their contractors were already or were         
expected be working on myriad projects relating to infrastructural   
development, including water, electricity, and construction, and   
reaching the into the daily lives of even small villages through small 
projects hiring locals to dig ditches and remove trash. This portrait, 
and the reality that U.S. policy sought to enact, assumed a pervasive 
and controlling U.S. presence in Iraq aimed at transforming the    
country, with various forms of armed forces (U.S. military, State         
Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and private security firms) 
involved in myriad aspects of the operation.  
 The late Bush and early Obama administrations expressed the 
same intentions for local transformation throughout Afghanistan 
(Schwartz 2009; Ellsberg et al. 2010). These ambitions also made their 
appearance in the military intervention in Pakistan, where the United 
States established an ‘elaborate system that tracks the funds’ it was 
investing in ‘post military reconstruction—not only schools but [also] 
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enterprise infrastructure.’48 The logic even extended to countries 
where no direct military intervention had occurred. In Jordan, for  
example, the Pentagon collaborated with King Abdullah in            
constructing a ‘state-of-the-art military and counterterrorism training 
facility’ that gave full expression to an intrusive U.S. military presence 
in the context of shared sovereignty. General Petraeus spoke at the 
opening ceremony, situating the center into the larger U.S. project of 
integrating the region, calling the facility ‘a center of excellence not only for 
doctrinal development and refinement of TTPs [technology, tactics and procedures], 
but for strengthening the regional security network emerging in this area’ (Turse 
2010).  
 We see, then, that the military responsibilities and goals    
expressed in General Petraeus’ testimony in Congress, in the National 
Security Strategies filed by the Bush and Obama administrations, and 
by the various plans enunciated by both the Defense and State        
Departments converged into the strategic orientation sketched out by 
recent scholarship, augmented by military primacy in non-kinetic   
reconstruction. 
 
  The interventions, while expressing ample quanta 
of Realpolitik intentions, also invoked a full   
measure of humanitarian motives. 
 
  Beyond the traditional military task of replacing 
the government of the target societies, these      
interventions sought an    encompassing social 
and economic transformation aimed at            
integrating these countries into the neoliberalized 
global economy and establishing a Western-style 
electoral system. These reforms would act as a 
guarantee against the restoration of the internal 
pathologies that had generated humanitarian crisis 
and animated the intervention. 
 
 This transformation involved dismantling        
dysfunctional systems within existing society, 
building replacement systems integrated into the 
globalized political, economic and cultural system, 
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and developing a system of shared sovereignty 
involving a long term U.S. presence as an active 
partner in the key political-economic structures in 
the host society. 
 
  The U.S. military would play a primary role in the 
initial (mainly political) actions that eliminated the 
old system and its constituent (political, economic, 
cultural) structures, but also take a leading role in 
both the building of the new system, and in (at 
least the initial stages) of shared sovereignty.  
 
 This nexus of responsibilities projected the military into a 
new role, one that was not part of earlier military interventions over 
the decades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and beyond the 
portraits developed either by theorists of neoliberalism or analysts of 
the changing profile of military action. It was the expansion of military 
responsibilities that set in motion a host of processes that had        
profound impact on-the-ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, that would 
create negative lock-in effects on the welfare of their citizens, and that 
would presage similar consequences in other countries subject to    
ambitious twenty-first century intervention.  
 
PART III - INVASION, TRANSFORMATION, AND               
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
 At its most general level, the policy enunciated by General 
David Petraeus involved a marriage of military means with           
transformative goals, to be applied to his area of responsibility as a 
whole, and to Iraq and Afghanistan specifically. The implementation 
of this mission required in Iraq and Afghanistan (and might well     
require elsewhere) an intrusive—first military, then civilian—presence 
that would be the enabling process for fully implementing the policy. 
What could not be visible—at least ahead of time—was its effect on 
the daily lives of Iraqis, Afghans, and other host populations as the 
impact of this attempted military-primary transformation matured.  
 As the Obama administration entered office, eight years after 
the invasion of Afghanistan and six years after the invasion of Iraq, 
the on-the-ground impact had become evident (particularly in Iraq, 
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which had been the focal point of Bush administration policy) and the 
causal relationships between the policy and its consequences clarified. 
Stated briefly, the combination of intervention with transformation, 
engineered by kinetic military force, sets in motion a downward spiral 
of pacification campaigns and cycles of immiseration for the host 
population, leading to both endless war and eventual humanitarian 
crisis. This section seeks to understand how this operates as a general 
pattern, and in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. Discussed in the        
following stages: 
 
 Structural Adjustment in the Middle East. We begin 
with a review of the government reform instituted 
by the U.S.-led occupations, stressing particularly 
the neoliberal policies (at least partially)                 
implemented at the national level after the                   
creation of the new regimes. 
 
 Conjoining Military Occupation and Structural          
Adjustment: The Vicious Cycle of Pacification. We then 
consider the unique pattern in the Middle East, in 
which the military was the primary vehicle for 
structural adjustment (in the absence of a viable 
indigenous government). This produces a vicious 
cycle of pacification.  
 
 The Vicious Cycle of Pacification: How the Cycle of      
Violence Produces a Cycle of Immiseration. From this 
we identify a set of processes that produce cycles 
of escalating resistance and more ferocious                   
pacification campaigns. Embedded in the cycle of 
violence is another cycle in which reconstruction  
projects initiated after pacification contribute to 
immiseration and help to trigger the next military     
intervention, which produces a new round of  
amplified immiseration.  
 
 Having analyzed this set of primary dynamics, we move the 
lens of analysis from the kinetic military dynamics to the two other 
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legs of the pacification cycle. In Part IV, we focus on the cycle of  
immiseration that operates within the larger pacification cycle, seeking 
to trace its implications for both human welfare and its role in       
generating never-ending activism at local levels. In Part V, we look at 
the inevitability of pulsing resistance to the occupation and to its   
neoliberal agenda; and the potential of this resistance to alter (or  
deepen) the pacification/immiseration cycle.  
 
Structural Adjustment in the Middle East 
 In the first instance, the vision of regional integration      
enunciated by Petraeus and fundamental to U.S. policy in the Middle 
East, relied on opening the local economies to the globalized        
economy led by the transnational capitalist class. These goals therefore 
depended on an economic revolution in the target countries. The   
process of ‘opening up’ Middle Eastern economies implied, at a    
minimum, allowing relatively unfettered investment by the             
multinational corporations that constituted the core of the globalized 
economy. But this sort of access required dismantling substantial    
portions of the host economy. Government-owned, government   
subsidized, or tariff protected enterprises within the host country   
constituted an insurmountable barrier to investment by transnational 
financial and industrial corporations, and penetration by imported 
products. Hence, this nexus of protection must be dismantled.       
Depending on the size and centrality of such protected enterprises, 
this dismantling could dramatically disrupt the economy as whole, as 
their employees lost their jobs, while trading partners with these     
enterprises experienced contraction or closure. In Iraq, with          
state-owned enterprises constituting 35% of the economy, the       
disruption was destined to be apocalyptic (Klein 2004,2007; Schwartz 
2008).  
 In addition to the elimination of competition from           
government-protected enterprises, the success of foreign capital and 
products in the local markets also depended on their ability to attract 
labor and customers. Insofar as the government provided key services 
at non-market prices or paid its employees wages that exceeded the 
standards set by international investors, it would deprive the         
globalized economy of the needed labor and customers. In this     
context, then, a favorable investment climate required carefully      
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circumscribed government services and employment.  
 These broad and potentially momentous changes in the    
functioning of the domestic economy necessarily lead to a broader set 
of social and political disruptions. The rising (perhaps exploding)    
unemployment and the declining (perhaps collapsing) public services 
potentially create calamities among those directly effected, quite    
probably a considerable proportion of the population. The reactions 
of those affected, depending on their numbers and location in the 
system, then ripple or rip through the fabric of society. Here again, 
Iraq suffered particularly acute versions of these processes (see       
below). 
This nexus of reforms undertaken by the U.S. occupation in Iraq and 
less visibly in Afghanistan did not differ in substance from the       
traditional demands made by the World Bank and International    
Monetary Fund when they undertook ‘structural adjustment’ in      
implementing rescue loans for troubled economies of the global 
south, beginning in the mid-1970s.49 The goal of ‘opening’ articulated 
by the Bush and Obama administrations, constituted the twenty-first 
century version of structural adjustment, applied to Middle Eastern 
economies that had, despite the considerable pressure in the previous 
century, continued to control their internal markets through various 
state-centered initiatives. Summarizing this trend, Toby Dodge      
observed: ‘the state-driven development strategies pursued      
throughout the region from the 1950s onwards were directly and   
indirectly sheltered from the dynamics of the global                      
economy’ (2006:462).50  
 What distinguished the process of economic ‘opening’ in Iraq 
and Afghanistan from the process of structural adjustment in the   
previous century was the use of military power as the engine of 
change. In Chile, Argentina, Russia and numerous other countries 
where IMF/World Bank structural adjustment was undertaken (with 
mixed results), the leverage applied to effect the transformation was 
the promise of rescue loans to end an economic crisis; with the       
indigenous government, co-opted and coerced by the financial        
leverage into becoming the instrument of implementation.51 In Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the economic transformation could only be initiated 
once an indigenous regime constructed upon a foundation of state 
control (of the economy and much else) was dismantled, leaving the 
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newly established occupation (and its newly established client regime) 
with the responsibility for enacting the needed reforms. The main   
implementation tool was therefore the victorious military, the only 
institution with a ready-to-function organization capable of reaching 
into the various geographic, social, and economic regions.  
 
Conjoining Military Occupation and Structural Adjustment  
 In both Afghanistan and Iraq, there was no instant rebellion 
against the occupation, and therefore no immediate call for extensive 
kinetic operations. On the contrary, the initial reaction among most 
ordinary citizens to the overthrow of unpopular and oppressive      
governments was ambivalent at worst, and enthusiastic in at least a 
substantial minority (WPO, 2006; BBC, 2007). The relative lack of 
wholesale destruction during the toppling of the incumbent regimes, 
which crumbled quickly under the pressure of the invaders,           
contributed to this modulated response, though the pre-invasion 
‘shock and awe’ campaign in Iraq generated bitterness in the Baghdad 
population subjected to it (Shaw, 2005:115f) In Iraq, in the first 
months after the fall of Saddamist regime, there were fewer than ten 
violent attacks per day on the occupation military and administration 
(Brookings Institution, 2007).  
 The surge in protest and violence began somewhat later, 
when the dislocations associated with economic transformation 
reached a large number of local citizens. In Iraq, the surge began 
when the occupation regime set about dismantling the government 
under the banner of Debaathification—demobilizing the army and 
shuttering the vast majority of government owned, operated, or      
subsidized agencies and enterprises, sending hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers and employees home.52 This dismantling process eroded the 
quality of life of a large number of families suddenly deprived of their 
often middle class income and of the services that government     
agencies had provided. The secondary consequences of this drastic 
reduction deprived a huge number of enterprises of paying customers 
for all variety of goods and services, spreading immiseration through 
the country, and generating the first surge of active discontent. By mid 
2004, as the immiseration took hold, insurgent attacks reached 50 per 
day and continued to rise, exceeding 100 per day a year later and      
approaching 200 by late 2006 (Brookings, 2007:7). 
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 The architects of the economic transformation had expected 
passive acceptance of this initial immiseration. This prediction may 
have rested on the response to structural adjustment in many      
countries of the global south, where even widespread discontent—at 
least in its initial phases—was managed without major eruptions. In 
fact, the imposition of abrupt economic austerity through structural 
adjustment had acquired a piquant name—’economic shock         
treatment’—suggesting that the force of the economic changes 
worked to shock those negatively impacted into immobility, in much 
the same way that ‘electro-shock’ treatment—passing an electric     
current through the patient's brain—pacifies obstreperous mental   
patients (Klein, 2006, Ch. 1). 
 The key to the successful application of ‘economic shock 
treatment’ lay in its administration by an intact indigenous regime with 
a full array of responses, ranging from ferocious repression (e.g., 
Chile) to cooptation and conciliation (e.g., Argentina). The choice of 
responses and the ability to shift from one to another in light of    
circumstances reflected both the sovereignty of the regime—the    
acceptance by the population of its right to make policy choices and 
enact them—and its administrative viability—its capacity to            
implement and enforce decisions or laws all the way down to the level 
of small communities. In no small measure, this administrative       
sovereignty rested on and derived from the indigenous government’s 
ability to apprehend and understand the mood and intentions of the 
population in diverse communities around the country—in military 
jargon, reliable intelligence.  
 In the special context created by the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, ‘economic shock treatment’ did not and could not work 
because the initial destruction of the indigenous government deprived 
the occupation of the necessary tool for managing both drastic change 
and the inevitable discontent. It is significant that in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the Bush administration specifically excluded an effort to 
organize coup d’états to replace existing rulers with leaders supportive 
of U.S. goals—and thus preserve the administrative structure (and 
power structure) of the predecessor regime. This path untaken        
reflected the (more than plausible) conviction that the state structures 
of these countries—though very different from each other—were 
incompatible with the transformative goals of the invasion. Both the 
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fundamentalist backbone of Taliban government in Afghanistan, and 
the tightly controlled state-centered economy practiced by the        
Saddamist regime were antithetical to goal of integrating these      
countries into the globalized world of transnational capitalism.    
Douglas Lovelace, director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the 
U.S. Army War College, succinctly summarized this analysis just    
before the invasion of Iraq, warning that the US would have to: 
 
  undertake to provide time, considerable                      
manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct 
Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the              
success of military operations will be ephemeral, 
and the problems they were designed to eliminate 
could return or be replaced by new and more    
virulent difficulties. 53 
 
 In the larger context of the Middle East, this same logic could 
be applied to virtually every other regime in the region.54  
 
The Vicious Cycle of Pacification: How the Cycle of Violence Produces a Cycle of 
Immiseration 
 What is left unanalyzed by the theorists of this new          
transformational warfare—and by most scholars who study it—are 
the on-the-ground dynamics set in motion by the marriage of military 
primacy and neoliberal transformation. 
 When the military has no transformational responsibilities, 
the battle to pacify the country proceeds on a community-by-
community basis in the  regions where resistance arises. When              
pacification includes economic and social transformation, however, a 
self-replicating cycle of military conquest becomes an all-too-routine 
pattern. In outline form, it works in the following way. 
 
 The military conquers a locality, dismantles the 
incumbent government and moves on to new 
conquests. The violence of this attack leaves a 
residue of  anger.  
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 The local area mobilizes itself to reconstruct the 
damaged social and economic structure, often also 
building violent and non-violent resistance to the 
occupation.  
 
 At least some of these rebuilt structures are               
contradictory to the transformative agenda of the 
occupation, while others might mount attacks 
against the occupation army or its domestic allies.  
 
 With only a military weapon, the occupation army 
returns, reconquers the community and forcibly 
dismantles the offending structures while hunting 
down insurgents, generating even greater anger 
and greater resistance. 
 
 If the occupation army departs, the cycle of              
reconstruction and reconquest recurs. If the army 
remains and ini tiates transformative                          
reconstruction, ‘economic shock treatment’              
generates a new round of resistance, non-violent 
or violent. As long as the army stays, even                    
passivity is fraught with tension.  
 
 While the United States and its allies considered the initial 
annihilation of the predecessor governments in Iraq and Afghanistan 
a necessary pre-requisite for the transformative project, the inevitable 
result was the hasty construction of new regimes with the sketchiest 
administrative presence, even in the capital cities. In the hinterlands—
excepting those few with a large military presence—the dissolution of 
central government left behind orphaned remnants of the deposed 
regime with no resources and little authority. 56 
 This vacuum produced one of the key unanticipated          
consequences of military-led neoliberal transformation. Facing myriad 
problems—including fundamental survival issues—without the     
presence of incumbent governments capable of suppressing and   
channeling the discontent, local communities organized themselves. 
Into the breach flowed the quite-often-rich civil society based around 
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churches and tribal structures, which in most cases had ambivalent 
relationships to both the recently ousted (and largely detested) regime 
and the newly formed (and so far useless) central government. In   
varying combinations, these groupings formed ad hoc local            
administrations with varying degrees of local legitimacy and viability, 
commanding varying degrees of compliance based on a varying      
mixture of consent and coercion. These local formations sought—
with widely varying degrees of success—to reverse or ameliorate the 
rippling disruption of family and community life wrought by both the 
military campaigns and by the socio-economic transformations      
instituted by the occupation.57  
 While these responses varied widely from locality to locality, 
they were all rooted in the existing social and economic system and 
therefore contradictory or resistant to the economic and political 
transformations sponsored by the occupation. For the most part, 
therefore, they articulated and nurtured protest against the new       
regime. Across many localities, consistent patterns emerged, including 
the formation of local militias to institute a new law and order, the 
revival of the pre-existing local economy, attempts at restoration of 
public services, the expression of collective protest against             
unemployment and economic hardship, and—often, though not    
always—support for the perpetrators of disruptive or violent attacks 
against the occupation regime.  
 Without the services of a functioning and legitimate national 
government, the occupation would inevitably be required to rely on 
the military to respond to the challenges—whether they were violent 
or peaceful. It is important to contrast these responsibilities with 
those thrust upon the military when its job had been only to oust the 
sitting government. While the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions did at 
first involve a conventional war aimed at defeating a conventional 
army, conquering a capital city, and toppling a sitting government; its 
subsequent mission was drastically different from earlier ‘post combat’ 
duties. 58 
 In previous wars conducted by the West in what is now called 
the Global South, post-combat rebuilding by local communities could 
often be supported and even facilitated by the occupation itself. With 
or without occupation collaboration, the human rights regime often 
mobilized global aid in support of these efforts. In the context of   
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social and economic transformation that characterizes twenty-first 
century Western warfare, these rebuilding projects often constituted a 
threat to the overarching mission, since much of this reconstruction 
would restore the (dangerous) institutions slated to be replaced.  
 In the context of Iraq and Afghanistan—each operating   
without a functioning government—the military was tasked with    
constraining or dismantling a civil-society-based movement            
advocating and enacting (at the local level) social and economic      
policies contrary to the goals of the occupation. The (armed or    
peaceful) activists pressing for these contrary goals were, moreover, 
often embedded in the local community as political, religious or tribal 
leaders. Assigning the army the task of responding to this broad     
spectrum of local activism guaranteed a kinetic response, aimed at 
‘rooting out’ the activists who spearheaded it.  
 This ‘rooting out’ process thus was an organic (and perhaps 
inevitable) consequence of the logic of military conquest in service of 
neoliberal social transformation (Schwartz 2008). Virtually all variants 
of efforts to defeat embedded community resistance aim at             
decapitating the leadership and destroying the underlying personnel 
structure, a process that almost inevitably damages the physical       
infrastructure of the communities that house the resistance. In Iraq 
and Afghanistan, this strategy generated the by-now familiar imagery 
of U.S. soldiers bursting into homes in midnight raids aimed at       
surprising suspected insurgents, applying overwhelming fire-power 
against the least gesture of resistance, and launching rubble-creating 
air strikes when local residents/insurgents chose to stand and fight.58 
This methodology—attacking the buildings that contain suspected 
combatants—not only produces extensive property damage, but also 
injures or kills large numbers of non-combatants who reside or are 
sheltered in the targeted district. During sustained battles, the local 
population and the community’s physical infrastructure may 
(inevitably) become targets in their own right, since their destruction 
or death deprives the enemy of needed resources to survive the 
siege—on the one hand, electricity, water, and roads provided by 
physical infrastructure; on the other hand, food, shelter and medical 
care from civilian supporters. 59 
 Eliminating the organizational personnel and leadership of 
the resistance, together with the destruction of physical infrastructure, 
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serves three functions in the minds of the architects of occupations 
designed to conquer and transform the invaded country. First, these 
battles provide the immediate benefit of killing or capturing hard-to-
find and hard-to-eliminate enemy combatants (or activists) while    
debilitating the larger organization in which they operate. Second,   
military strategies that injure or destroy local political, economic or 
social systems—however immediately destructive—eliminate support 
for the old political-economy, clearing the way for the new regime. 
Finally, the local residents learn that there is a large price to pay for 
non-compliance to the new order and/or support of the insurgents, 
discouraging future resistance and/or future efforts to reconstruct the 
pre-occupation social and economic structure. 
 In practice, this strategy involves penetration of the offending 
locality with an overwhelming military force. Virtually all such        
operations are successful in taking control of the area, many with little 
actual combat. Even these relatively non-violent operations           
nevertheless generate bitterness and—perhaps more important—
immiseration, since even the most peaceful process involves home 
invasions, forceful incarceration of suspects, and considerable      
property destruction as part of the search for combatants and      
weapons inside of homes and communities.60 Where actual fighting 
occurs—including in many instances the lethality of an aerial or      
artillery barrage—it adds substantially to the already degraded        
condition of the targeted community: destroying private and public 
buildings, further weakening or collapsing vulnerable electrical,      
sewage, and water systems, and injuring or killing many residents of 
the community. In all too many of these instances the battle becomes 
a siege in which entire neighborhoods or villages become targets; in 
these cases the destruction is definitive, rendering many homes or an 
entire community uninhabitable, with the surviving families decimated 
or destitute (Schwartz 2008).  
 These raids—with or without the ensuing battles—generate 
full-on anger among the residents. Those who flee the community and 
become displaced carry their anger with them. Once the army moves 
on to its next operation, those remaining attempt to restore their old 
regime and—often enough—begin a new round of protest and      
rebellion. At this point, the military faces the unsavory prospect of 
needing to reconquer a neighborhood, village, or even a city that it 
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had already pacified.  
 The migration of the occupation military from one ‘insurgent 
stronghold’ to another generates a potentially endless cycle of         
pacification, immiseration, resistance, pacification, and renewed (and 
often amplified) resistance. The initial fighting is itself the source of a 
variety of humanitarian issues. As the army moves on to its next     
target, the prostrate community organizes itself to repair the damage 
and build a resistance to what might be the next round of fighting, 
sometimes aided by NGOs and other elements in the human rights 
regime. These initial local responses often constitute direct or indirect 
challenges to the occupation, provoking new pacification efforts by 
the newly imposed military-primary regime, including, in too many 
cases, kinetic operations. These military operations then lead to     
further economic and social degradation, both as a byproduct of the 
confrontational violence and the attempt to destroy or dismantle the 
social infrastructure that fueled violent resistance and/or local efforts 
at reconstituting the social structure slated for elimination. The       
consequences are therefore a deeper immiseration—often leading to 
displacement—than the previous iteration of fighting, and—in most 
cases—a more ferocious anger, sometimes drifting into terrorism. If 
and when the occupation military moves on, the remaining residents 
undertake a new round of rebuilding efforts and frequently amplified 
rebellion; with the circle closing when this new round of local         
organization triggers another round of pacification.  
 
An Example: Counterinsurgency in Marja and the Vicious Cycle of Pacification 
 The ascension of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency led to 
an assessment of military operations in Afghanistan, resulting in a 
surge strategy energized by a 30,000 soldier increase and aggressive 
new offensives in Taliban strongholds, including a dramatic            
acceleration of nighttime raids against suspected insurgents, averaging 
over 300 per month from early 2010 to mid-2011. This dramatic     
escalation featured the use of a rejuvenated counterinsurgency strategy 
(COIN) that had been pioneered by CENTCOM commander       
Petraeus in Iraq, specifically designed to break the pacification-
repacification cycle.61 The most prominent early effort took place in 
the Marja region, a Taliban stronghold, and the negative results there  
provided a clear illustration of both the failure of the new COIN   
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strategy and the elements that constituted the vicious cycle of         
pacification.  
 In the viewpoint of U.S. military strategists, the cycle of    
pacification producing immiseration triggering rebellious                
reconstruction triggering pacification triggering enhanced               
immiseration triggering enhanced rebellion triggering re-pacification 
would be broken in Afghanistan by COIN’s chief innovation—a 
‘clear, hold, and build’ philosophy. Since the renewed rebellion most 
often occurs once the military moves on to new battles, this algorithm 
requires a medium-term military presence in each local community 
(the ‘hold’ part of the strategy) leading later (as the ‘build’ part of the 
strategy takes hold) into the shared sovereignty proposed by Krasner, 
in which indigenous officials eventually shoulder responsibility for 
ongoing administration (Krasner 2005). While the ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ 
elements more-or-less-inevitably create new waves of immiseration 
and potential rebellion, the ‘build’ stage is designed to defuse the clear
-and-hold-generated-bitterness by erecting a new infrastructure      
capable of supporting political, economic, and social renewal.  
 Beyond the fabulous resources needed to apply such a      
strategy across entire countries like Afghanistan and Iraq—or even 
targeted to rebellious regions, like the Taliban strongholds in the 
south of Afghanistan or the ‘Sunni triangle’ and Anbar Province in 
Iraq—an inevitable contradiction between COIN and the             
transformative goals of the U.S. occupation makes breaking the cycle 
breathtakingly difficult. The transformative agenda implies minimal 
rebuilding—or, more likely, active dismantling—of local social and 
economic arrangements. Thus, the ‘build’ part of ‘clear, hold and 
build’ cannot involve rebuilding the existing village-town-city       
structure; instead, it must be further dismantled and replaced with the 
new ‘open’ political economy mandated by twenty-first century U.S. 
foreign policy. As retired army colonel Douglas Macgregor—a West 
Point class mate of Petraeus’ commanding general within Afghanistan, 
David McChrystal—put it, COIN applied to the Middle East called 
upon CENTCOM to ‘reshape the culture of the Islamic world,’ one 
village-town-neighborhood and city at a time.62 
 In his congressional testimony, Petraeus (2009) gestured at 
the depth of the project when he mentioned the necessity of rooting 
out opium production and replacing it with an entirely new rural   
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economy. This agricultural transformation was part of a larger      
transformation, including a revolutionized cultural and political life, 
since opium cultivation had become a major foundation for Taliban 
governance in contested areas.  
 A few months later, the ill fated General McChrystal         
described this strategy in the context of his first major COIN        
offensive in the Marja region, promising that the ‘build’ operation 
would be quite rapid, because ‘We’ve got a government in a box, 
ready to roll in’ (Filkins 2010). That is, once the resistance was       
defeated, he would ‘roll in’ a governing structure, populated by        
pre-trained Afghan administrators uncontaminated by commitment to 
the soon-to-be replaced local political economy. Sharing sovereignty 
with the U.S. military that had just conquered the area, they would 
quickly begin building a whole new social and economic system, from 
schools to agriculture to police forces. To paraphrase General        
Petraeus, in Iraq and Afghanistan the goal was to ‘clear, hold, and 
build,’ not ‘clear, hold, and rebuild’ (Petraeus 2009).  
 In Marja and numberless other localities in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, counterinsurgency strategy foundered on the impracticality of 
importing a whole new society into a conquered province or village. 
The prosperous future that McChrystal’s ‘government in a box’ was 
supposed to deliver could not possibly materialize, nor could the    
agricultural revolution promised in Petraeus’ congressional testimony.  
 Instead, each successful military occupation began by placing 
the target community in dire circumstances. The battle itself is likely 
to cause grievous harm to the local residents, as McChrystal himself 
conceded in a briefing to his troops after the Marja offensive had  
become unhinged: 
 
  To my knowledge, in the nine-plus months I've 
been here, not a single case where we have                 
engaged in an escalation of force incident and hurt 
someone has it turned out that the vehicle had a 
suicide bomb or weapons in it and, in many cases, 
had families in it. That doesn't mean I'm                       
criticizing the people [NATO soldiers] who are 
executing. I'm just giving you perspective. We've 
shot an amazing number of people and killed a 
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number and, to my knowledge, none has proven 
to have been a real threat to the force (Elliott 
2010; see also Oppel 2010).  
 
 The harm done in these firefights was only the beginning. If 
the battle itself was not calamitous, the ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ process    
inevitably involves hunting down suspected combatants and their   
supporters (based on worse than imperfect intelligence), home       
invasions, and the use of lethal force at any sign of resistance or     
escape (Gall 2011; Tirman 2011:272-6). Any possessions useful to 
resistance are confiscated and responsible parties arrested. Shops and 
merchants suspected (or capable) of aiding the resistance have their 
wares confiscated, and the offending elements of the local structure 
are dismantled. In the villages of Marja—and elsewhere in Iraq and 
Afghanistan—the arrival of U.S. or NATO forces triggered           
accelerated immiseration, flowing from the physical and economic 
assault, military or civilian. As one resident in the area considered to 
be largely sympathetic to the occupation told the New York Times, 
‘people in the villages are more scared of the Americans than of the 
Taliban’ (Gall 2011). 
 According to counterinsurgency theory, the newly built      
system should more-than-offset this initial destruction and alienation. 
But even when a ‘government in a box’ is ready to go, this work is 
problematic at best, and made infinitely more difficult when         
transformation is at the center of the agenda. When unaffiliated 
NGOs enter Afghan or Iraqi towns as part of the human rights      
regime to repair war damage, they can hope to harness the energy and 
resources of the local community, and utilize local leadership and  
institutions as allies.63 These local initiatives are often opposed by the 
occupation, since they can interfere with the transformative goals that 
accompany military humanism. Duffield summarized this              
contradiction in discussing the opposition among many political and 
military leaders to ameliorative aid programs initiated by the human 
rights regime, delivered without conditions that integrate the local 
economy into the discipline of transnational markets: 
 
  As a free good, that is, something that is given 
rather than earned, for many strategic actors [such 
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as military humanists] humanitarian assistance 
conjures up a number of free-market concerns 
and economic fears. Indeed, the idea of relief,    
especially the prospect of a long-term             
commitment in relation to the new wars, has               
created something of a moral panic in [neo]liberal 
circles. A particular phobia is that badly managed 
or unnecessary relief assistance will encourage 
dependency among recipients—since the             
distribution of free goods creates   economic                 
disincentives that are antithetical to                              
self-sufficiency and the workings of a market 
economy. It is argued, usually without much in the 
way of supporting evidence, that free goods can 
discourage household production, undermine 
markets and sap individual industry and                         
enterprises (IDC 1999). To the extent that this 
takes place, humanitarian action can actually        
deepen the cycle of destitution and                                    
impoverishment: it can strengthen dependency 
(Duffield, 2001:102). 64 
 
 Duffield cites the policy of the European Union, which    
explicitly acknowledged that humanitarian aid should be withheld 
when it interfered with prescribed transformation: ‘Within EU policy, 
consequently, a tension is evident in the requirement that while a 
commitment to humanitarian action must remain, relief assistance 
should not undermine “the way back to a long-term development  
process.”’65 
 The ‘build’ process in a transformative COIN campaign, 
therefore, attempts to impose a new set of social, political, and      
economic arrangements on unwilling subjects who most likely hate or 
fear the occupation, and the process often involves further            
undermining the lifestyle that locals are seeking to restore or sustain. 
In this context, the occupation must expend a large quantum of      
energy and resources to impose this new system on the resistant local 
populace. This is a daunting project in any context, but it is made      
all-the-more difficult when the local community retains the ability to 
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resist and rebel, the circumstances across Iraq and Afghanistan (as 
well as other potential and actual sites of twenty-first century         
intervention).  
 In the Marja region of Afghanistan, the cycle took less than 
two years to reach a new crescendo. Three months into the surge, 
General Petraeus announced that 2386 Taliban had been captured or 
killed in Marja and other targeted provinces, a number that grew to 
6100 by the end of 2009 (Porter 2011a). By June 2010, however, the 
local insurgents had returned to prominence in many of the villages; 
Afghan officials reported that ‘the population had become more    
antagonistic to NATO forces than was the case before the operation 
began’ (Lobe 2010a); the Washington Post reported that the 
‘government in a box’ was ‘largely empty’; and commanding general 
McChrystal conceded the project was ‘even more complex that we 
thought,’ calling the region ‘a bleeding ulcer.’66 
 In early summer 2011, independent reporter Gareth Porter 
(2011b), working from official U.S. Defense Department data,       
documented the amplified violence of the pacification-repacification 
cycle in Marja and other areas targeted by President Obama’s surge 
strategy. In May of 2011, the number of insurgent attacks was at least 
40% above the pre-surge baseline, despite the ongoing presence of 
NATO forces in many of the most rebellious areas.67 Even when      
following the COIN ‘clear, hold, and build’ formula, the outcome was 
amplified resistance.  
 The same pattern emerged in the highly publicized Bush   
Administration surge in Iraq, which created constantly accelerating 
insurgent violence until it was abandoned in 2008 (Schwartz 2008).  
 
PART IV – THE IMMISERATION CYCLE WITHIN THE     
PACIFICATION CYCLE 
 The literature on military humanism places stress on the   
dangers, both direct and indirect, of kinetic military action generating 
immiseration for the populations where the fighting takes place (see 
Part I above). This literature also acknowledges the growing           
involvement of intervening military forces in the economic and social 
infrastructure of the host countries, as an expression of both military 
primacy in extending neoliberal globalization and the incorporation of 
human rights motives into kinetic military intervention (also reviewed 
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in Part I above). In discussing these issues, however, most of the    
literature focuses on the national political process, with the military 
attacking and/or replacing the incumbent regime and coercing new 
economic and social policies more consistent with the economic and 
humanitarian goals of the intervention. There is only occasional     
attention given to the injection of military primacy into the day-to-day 
life of indigenous communities after the initial fighting has abated.68  
 Partly this neglect reflects the focus of this literature on the 
pre-2001 interventions, in which this new military primacy in the   
economic and social spheres was carefully delimited. It was only after 
9-11 that the expansive military role received full expression. Even in 
Afghanistan, this role evolved after the ouster of the Taliban regime, 
and it matured in parallel to the ‘post-conflict’ policies in Iraq.  
 Writing just before the start of the Iraq war, Army War      
College planners Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill explicitly          
considered the qualitatively new role for the military in the post ‘post 
conflict’ period in Iraq. They began by analyzing the 1990s             
humanitarian-justified interventions in Panama, Haiti and Bosnia, 
which featured strictly delimited rules for leaving local (not national) 
systems intact, supporting (but not actively participating in) locally 
initiated reconstruction, prompt withdrawal of all military forces, and 
eschewing all direct ‘nation building.’ Transformative tasks were     
instead allocated to the human rights regime—U.S. civilian agencies, 
NGOs and international government bodies—and the newly         
reformed indigenous governments (2003)69. Crane and Terrill then 
proffered a dramatically different plan for the military in the         
forthcoming Iraq invasion. During a four phase process lasting several 
years, they expected on-the-ground military primacy in a huge range 
of activities, including the nurturing of ‘outside investment, jobs     
programs, and educational institutions.’ While U.S. civilian agencies 
and Iraqi officials would eventually inherit primary responsibility 
(perhaps as quickly as three years), Crane and Terrill warned that a 
timely transfer ‘could not be assumed in Iraq,’ given earlier negative 
experiences with ‘civilian’ leadership, and the specific conditions     
expected to develop after the ouster of the Hussein regime. 70 
 This shift was duly noted by Kaldor in the preface to the  
Second Edition of her aptly titled volume New and Old Wars, in 
which she commented that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars used troops 
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(and humanitarian agencies) ‘in new ways,’ warning that the attempted 
enactment of these expansive responsibilities in the two wars ‘may 
have discredited the very notion of humanitarian intervention and 
peacekeeping’ (2007:ix,x-xi).71 
 In this section, we consider the processes at work in the     
military-primacy dynamics in Iraq and Afghanistan that further       
degrades the well-being of the resident population, creating an        
immiseration cycle within the pacification-repacification cycle. The 
argument focuses on the following constituent parts: 
 
 Chronic under-resourcing and the immiseration cycle. The 
failure to provide sufficient resources to complete 
and implement local economic and social                  
reconstruction flows from the neoliberal ideology 
that relies on private initiative and financing.               
These considerations increase the probability that 
locally initiated reconstruction will fail and that     
occupation-initiated construction leads to further          
degradation.  
 
 Neoliberal reconstruction and the inevitability of corruption. 
While indigenous politicians and private                      
companies participate in siphoning off large                 
portions of reconstruction budgets, the primary 
source of this corruption is the network of                  
international corporations placed in charge of            
underfunded transformative projects with few 
barriers to siphoning. 
 
 Markets without Investments. Structural adjustment as 
part of neoliberal reform relies on—after a period 
of difficulty—outside investment producing an 
expanding market economy delivering new jobs 
and new products. The dynamics of                                
military-primacy generates structural adjustment 
without investment, thus deepening the        
downward spiral of immiseration. Even the Iraqi 
oil industry, one of the most attractive investment 
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opportunities in the global economy, contributed 
to this process, making it an instructive example 
for glimpsing and analyzing the toxic mixture of 
military humanism and neoliberal reform.  
 
Chronic Under-Resourcing and the Immiseration Cycle 
 The ‘build’ phase of COIN in Marja and elsewhere failed to 
prevent a new round of resistance. This failure derived from the     
impracticality of importing a social system, half or fully formed, into 
an immiserated community struggling to survive (or escape) an      
increasingly desperate situation. What might be done quickly—
patching up existing economic and social systems (the sort of work 
often undertaken by human rights NGOs and UN agencies in these 
settings)—was excluded by the transformative project, since such    
repair work would help to restore the old structure that the             
occupation sought to displace. Building a new system required huge 
infusions of U.S. aid, and/or massive investment from international 
capital—with positive results produced in time to reverse the existing 
or impending calamity. None of these pre-requisites were met in    
Marja (or in other regions in Afghanistan or Iraq that had been targets 
of earlier or current pacification efforts).  
 In the context of the COIN ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy, 
support from local communities was, at least initially, rarely possible. 
The already immiserated conditions—exacerbated by the destructive 
impact of ‘clear and hold’—assures a reservoir of bitterness and anger 
(and, in many localities, organized rebellion). It is conceivable that the 
arrival of rejuvenating resources could, in the medium term, win over 
some or most local residents. Producing this type of improvement is 
therefore fundamental to COIN success.  
 It is in this context, that General David McChrystal’s 
‘government in a box’ might have been be a reasonable strategy, if it 
had led to a successful ‘build’ in the Marja district and other regions 
targeted by the Obama surge. The strategy foundered, however, on 
two intractable problems that are high-probability (if not inevitable) 
components of the military-primary economic and social                
reconstruction:the need for resources that exceed the willingness of 
the U.S. and its allies to provide, and their almost-inevitable misuse 
when the projects are directed either by the military itself or by       
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outside (often foreign) profit-seeking corporations integrated into the 
transnational capitalist class. We address the first of these problems 
here, and then consider the reliance on corporate outsiders in the next 
section.  
 
 Destructive development. Consider then, the infusion of U.S. aid 
to Marja, implemented in a shared sovereignty arrangement          
combining the NATO military and the pre-packaged ‘government in a 
box,’ with financing provided by various U.S. government agencies.72 
In Marja, a USAID effort to provide 4,000 water pumps was quickly 
‘scaled back by 75%’ because the shared-sovereignty administration 
could provide neither the security needed to protect the new          
installations nor the expertise needed to train locals in their installation 
and operation. More elaborate construction projects, including the 
revival and modernization of an abandoned irrigation system, were 
scrapped because locals could not implement the imported plan by 
themselves, and the shared-sovereignty administration had insufficient 
resources to fund and staff the project (Chandrasekaran 2010).  
 In some sense, the problems derive from inadequate         
resources devoted to the projects. With a far larger investment, 
USAID might have financed the successful installation of the 4,000 
water pumps (using outside contractors or NGOs), the local residents 
might have been trained to operate and maintain them (again by    
outsiders), and an ongoing infusion of resources would finance fuel 
and maintenance costs. With even more resources, the badly needed 
irrigation system could have become an actionable project. Such a 
investment would have, however, been a budget buster for USAID, 
which could not afford to provide uninstalled water pumps to all the 
localities that needed them, let alone provide the services needed to 
get them running. The irrigation system was beyond impractical.  
 Perhaps the most salient element of this doomed-from-the-
beginning situation is that local residents came to view even the 
trimmed-back water pump initiative with disgust. Their evaluation 
rested on the comparison of the new system—which fulfilled its     
reduced promise of 1000 new pumps—with the older inadequate   
water system it was supposed to replace. The older system, damaged 
by the fighting and by long-term decay, could have been repaired by 
the villagers themselves with a small infusion of capital to buy         
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materials and/or traditional NGO aid. Even expansion was feasible 
with another dollop of resources to buy new equipment that the locals 
already knew how to install and operate. In their calculus, this         
locally-based reconstruction would have provided substantially more 
water than the handful of new pumps that eventually went on line.  
 As a consequence, then, of a project designed to modernize 
the water system, the villagers experienced further immiseration      
deriving from the consequences of their now-chronically inadequate 
water supply, including the lack of irrigation for crops, the taxing     
process of hauling supplies long distances, and the health problems 
deriving from contamination.  
 The restoration project that the local residents had            
unsuccessfully demanded would have fit within the budget of USAID, 
but it was the path unchosen. It was a non-starter because the        
restored system would strengthen the insular local system in its      
resistance both to the occupation and to the economic ‘opening’    
process designed to attract outside investment and project the local 
economy into the global economic system. The water pump project 
thus became a crystalline example of what Suhrke labeled ‘destructive 
development’ (Surke 2007:1293).  
 
 Resource shortages and neoliberal reconstruction. Consider, then, the 
resource shortages that sabotaged the effectiveness of the new water 
pumping initiatives. With Afghan war expenses running at eight      
billion dollars per month (Center for Defense Information 2011), 
funding 4000 new water pumps would be budgetary child’s play. The 
ultimate problem, therefore, was not simply the cost, but rather the 
overarching neoliberal orientation to twenty-first century intervention. 
Writ large, military intervention was meant to ‘open’ these areas to the   
globalized market economy. The ‘build’ part of counterinsurgency 
should derive not primarily from the infusion of government          
subsidies, but from private enterprise seizing profitable opportunities 
in newly pacified and stabilized areas. Private enterprise would      
therefore make the choices about which areas could support self-
supporting development, and leave aside those which would be unable 
to support themselves and thus become a long term drain on         
resources (Natsios 2001; Jones 2009).  
 The ‘government in a box’ imported by surging NATO 
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troops was not supposed rebuild those areas without economic   
promise; it was instead tasked with establishing security and           
undertaking pilot projects that demonstrated the promise of economic 
development, and therefore attract private capital to (only) those areas 
where profitable development was possible. The few water pumps 
ultimately installed may have been inadequate for restoring water    
viability to the local areas impacted, and miscalculation (and even  
corruption) may have reduced the planned number by 75% or more, 
but these shortages derived ultimately from the determination to let 
the market decide where reconstruction should and would occur.  
 These on-the-ground budget problems hamstrung virtually all 
the work in Marja— problems replicated in hundreds of locations in   
Afghanistan and Iraq.73 In both countries, the investment simply did 
not materialize, even in areas with little fighting and histories of viable 
commerce. Consequently, there was virtually no visible alleviation of 
the local economic crisis in the first two years of the COIN project in 
Afghanistan (replicating the lack of progress in both countries over 
the years since the initial invasions). Washington Post interviews found 
locals seeing the few tangible signs of progress—for example, a few 
day-labor jobs, and a few schools opened briefly—offset by far more 
daunting degradation—for example, the loss of opium income and the 
destruction of bridges to prevent their use by the still unpacified    
insurgency.74 Journalist Ann Jones captured the mood in the Afghan 
villages subjected to COIN: 
 
  The formula, which is basic COIN, goes                
something like this: kill some civilians in the hunt 
for the bad guys and you have to make up for it 
by building a road. This trade-off explains why, as 
you travel parts of the country, interminable (and 
often empty) strips of black asphalt now traverse 
Afghanistan’s vast expanses of sand and rock, but 
it doesn’t explain why Afghans, thus                       
compensated, are angrier than ever. 
  
  Many Afghans, of course, are angry because they 
haven’t been compensated at all, not even with a 
road to nowhere. Worse yet, more often than not, 
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they’ve been promised things [like water pumps] 
that never materialize (Jones, 2010). 
 
 In Kandahar province, not far from Marja, the road          
construction initiatives became the poster child illustrating both under
-resourcing and the immiseration cycle within the pacification cycle.75 
The late 2010 pacification campaign against the Taliban encountered 
strong resistance, and the fighting exacted a heavy toll on the residents 
and the physical infrastructure. The village of Taroko Kalacha, for 
example, ‘was so heavily mined by the Taliban that American forces 
resorted to aerial bombardment and leveled the whole village of 36 
homes.’  
 The Afghan government estimated the cost of rebuilding 
from the Kandahar offensive at $100 million, while the NATO      
military command offered a more modest estimate of $30 million. 
Ultimately, both estimates were magnitudes higher than the actual 
expenditure in direct reconstruction; in the ensuing four months, 
NATO had paid less than four million dollars in compensation, with 
the rate of payment quickly tapering off. These niggardly outlays    
apparently reflected the neoliberal structural adjustment approach to 
reconstruction: potentially viable localities would attract private   
investment that would obviate the need for full compensation; while 
subsidies that could sustain the rejuvenation of ultimately non-viable 
locales would be counterproductive. A better investment was to apply 
the bulk of the reconstruction budget to the military’s dual-purpose 
initiatives, centered on installing ‘new roads which they hope will 
bring greater security and prosperity.’76 
 In Panjwaii, one of the villages in the district where wine  
production constituted the agricultural foundation of the economy, 
the strip of ‘black asphalt’ soon under construction traversed a     
number of vineyards, definitively destroying the livelihood (and the 
ancestral lands) of those effected, with woefully inadequate          
compensation adding insult to injury. More generally devastating was 
the destruction of the venerable, but viable, irrigation system, leaving 
‘acres of vineyards without water,’ and causing a plurality of residents 
seeing ‘their only source of livelihood taken away.’ 
 As highway construction proceeded, the local anger found 
various forms of expression. Tribal and religious leaders petitioned the 
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‘government in a box’ officials and the NATO officers to alter the 
route or cancel the highway altogether. Affected residents mounted 
various public protests, including the much-applauded act of civil   
disobedience by Bor Muhammad, who ‘lay down in front of          
bulldozers in a effort to save his farm.’ When this failed, he was given 
$6,000 compensation, far too little to restore his family finances, and 
Muhammad vowed to ultimately ‘wrest his land back.’  
 Abdul Nafi, a farmer who lost his two acres of vines and  
almond trees to the road, spoke for many in the community when he 
told the New York Times, ‘The people are angry. The foreigners should 
not upset the people, otherwise they would go and join the Taliban.’ 
 Perhaps he and Bor Muhammad were among the group of 
residents who contacted the Taliban, which promised ‘to blow up the 
road and return their land to them’ as soon as military situation made 
it possible.  
 These events raise the question of why the occupation and its 
nascent Afghan government chose the highway as its signature      
reconstruction project, when its destructive, immiserating, and       
infuriating impact was visible to the naked eye of both residents and 
occupiers; and/or why the occupation failed to provide at least       
sufficient compensation to offer residents the hope of rehabilitating 
their living standards. Partly the answer lies in the rigor with which 
neoliberal principles have been applied in Iraq, Afghanistan and other 
sites of U.S. intervention since 911, which sought to wean civil society 
(in the Middle East and elsewhere) from its reliance on state activism 
to address all issues, and force these localities into the globalized 
economy, where they would prosper or flounder based to their ability 
to create attractive investment opportunities.  
 These policies made the ‘black asphalt’ an attractive          
investment, since it could become an infrastructural foundation for 
opening these insular locations to world trade, and therefore facilitate 
the search for profit seeking investment, provided the locals           
positioned themselves to take advantage of the opportunity. In this 
context, the destruction to the local economy might itself be 
‘constructive,’ since the economically denuded landscape would be 
available for new investment with better prospects in the international 
market. 
 At the same time, the primacy of the military in making these 
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choices also pushed toward the ‘black asphalt’ reconstruction policies. 
After nine years of the pacification-repacification cycle in Afghanistan, 
the NATO forces were sensitive to lessons learned in previous       
iterations. Canadian Major Eric Landry explained to the New York 
Times that the absence of transportation between outposts had       
facilitated the successful Taliban revival in the area after a 2007       
pacification campaign. Major Landy extracted this lesson from the 
2007 pacification cycle: ‘It is important to get this [highway] built   
before the next fighting season.’ In Major Landry’s view—and that of 
many NATO commanders—the pacification cycle was endless, and 
he was determined to use reconstruction funds to facilitate the next 
repacification campaign. 
 In Helmond Province, where Marja is located, and in       
Kandahar Province, where Pnajwaii and Taroko Kalacha are located, 
the Obama surge offered a crystalline illustration of the immiseration 
cycle embedded within the pacification-repacification cycle.  
 
 The entry of the occupation military into the area triggered 
a round of fighting, leaving the residents in newly         
immiserated conditions.  
 
 Neoliberal policy insured that any delivered compensation 
would be insufficient to support self-actuated rebuilding of 
the existing economic and social infrastructure.  
 
 Occupation initiated reconstruction, animated by military 
goals and neoliberal economic policy, further degraded local 
conditions while attempting to lay a foundation for outside 
investment, but in the immediate circumstances            
initiating further immiseration. 
 
 Eventually, local residents organized resistance, some     
passive, some disruptive, some violent.  
 
 The occupation, faced with renewed rebellion, entered into a 
new ‘fighting season,’—a new round of pacification.  
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Neoliberal Reconstruction and the Inevitability of Corruption 
 The cycle of immiseration operating in small villages and rural 
regions of Afghanistan was matched at the national level in Iraq and 
later in Afghanistan, affecting large portions of the country in a single 
sweeping process. This much larger canvas for the concentric cycles 
of pacification and immiseration allows us to glimpse the processes 
that produce corruption as a major feature of both the occupation 
regime and the client government it produces.  
 In Iraq, the United Nations estimated that $80 billion would 
be required to rebuild the existing infrastructure (water, sewage,     
electricity, roads, hospitals, schools) after the brief but destructive war 
that ousted the Hussein regime.77 (The cost of transforming that       
infrastructure into one able to serve an economy integrated into the 
globalized world would have been magnitudes larger). Nevertheless, 
the United States allocated only $20 billion to the project, attracting 
(mostly unfulfilled) promises of an additional five billion from its 
‘Coalition of the Willing,’ and expecting to apply (perhaps $10 billion) 
Hussein era oil earnings to the kitty. As the war morphed into a six-
year pacification campaign, the cycle of pacification-immiseration-
protest-repacification took its toll; the projected cost of simple          
reconstruction escalated dramatically, while the U.S. reconstruction 
allocation shrunk (with much of the budget diverted to security      
expenses). Ultimately, the occupation spent only $11 billion on      
reconstruction against a projected cost above $200 billion, leaving 
every effort impossibly underfunded.  
 The electrical system in Iraq, fundamental to personal and 
economic life, received an infusion of $4.8 billion against a            
reconstruction cost estimated in 2006 at over $20 billion. In 2010, the 
Iraqi electrical grid generated fewer hours of electricity per day than it 
had just after the initial U.S. offensive severely damaged it, a stark 
(and fully visible) symptom of the immiseration process experienced 
during the seven years of occupation (Schwartz 2008:154-5;     
McDermid and Walled 2010). In this instance—and in other           
infrastructural areas including water purification, medical care,     
housing, education, and transportation—the years of occupation had 
produced a palpable decline in the quality of life (Schwartz 2008).  
 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the impossibility of             
reconstructing the indigenous countries based on the budget allowed 
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by U.S. government only partially explains the failure to re-engineer 
the social and economic infrastructure. Even the relatively meager $11 
billion invested in Iraq could have (or should have) produced at least 
moderate improvements in infrastructural functioning; and if the fully 
allocated amount has been invested in reconstruction, the results 
might have been substantial. In Afghanistan, the United States 
pledged $10.4 billion, ultimately delivering $5 billion with similarly 
negative effects (Jones 2009).  
 The tale of decline instead of modest improvement resulting 
from the infusion of vast sums of investment derived from the     
transformative goal of U.S. policy, harnessed once again to the details 
of the military occupation. The goal of these investments was not to 
implement a viable infrastructure, but rather to lay a foundation for 
attracting outside investment. This ambition was articulated by      
Andrew Natsios, head of the U.S. Agency for International            
Development (USAID), who described U.S. reconstruction aid as 
aimed at helping ‘nations prepare for participation in the global trading system 
and become better markets for U.S. exports’ (Natsios 2001; quoted in Jones 
2009). This soaring ambition was not, however, fulfilled. In July of 
2011, after eight years of preparing Iraq ‘for participation in the global 
trading system,’ James Jeffreys, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,          
conceded that, ‘What we haven't seen yet ... is a lot of American    
investment’ (Chaudry 2011). Without this investment, even the most 
successful reconstruction projects produced destructive development, 
contributing to the ongoing degradation of local life.  
 
 Why neoliberal reconstruction produces corruption. The marriage of 
underfunded reconstruction harnessed to neoliberal transformation 
and military pacification placed everyone involved under a complex 
set of cross cutting pressures.  
 One of these cross-cutting pressures arose from the ground 
level. Because these transformational projects (like the highway    
building campaign in Afghanistan) were contradictory to the will of 
indigenous civil society and outside their area of competence, those 
called upon to enact these projects would have to be outsiders, and 
this necessity fit comfortably into the neoliberal stance of privatizing 
economic enterprise and attracting globalized enterprise.  
 In Iraq, for example, the core enterprises in the pre-invasion 
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electrical industry were government-owned—key elements in the    
insular, state-dominated economy that U.S. policy was committed to 
dismantling. These enterprises were therefore among the 192 state-
owned firms shuttered in the first six months of the U.S. occupation 
in 2003 (Schwartz 2008). Many of the private sector companies in this 
industry quickly collapsed without government subsidies and          
contracts; and the occupation regime disqualified most of the         
survivors from participation in U.S.-sponsored reconstruction because 
their competence lay in the outmoded local installations, incompatible 
with the globalized technology that the U.S. sought to introduce into 
the country.  
 These same dynamics operated in Afghanistan’s agricultural 
areas. With opium at the core of the rural economy, the entire       
operation needed to be dismantled, including suppliers, working 
farms, and the merchants handling the raw or refined product. The 
new system would necessarily require the importation of supplies,   
machinery and experts to rework the agriculture economy, replacing 
those associated with opium production (Jones 2009).  
 In both cases, the occupation hired multinational companies, 
many with enduring ties to the U.S. military, to undertake large new 
projects.78 These contractors, apparently selected for their integration 
into the ‘global trading system’ (Natsios 2002), were nevertheless   
severely handicapped in their ability to operate in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Because of the insularity of these societies, these outsiders had no  
experience with local construction challenges. Among other            
difficulties, their lack of familiarity with the technical aspects of the 
local infrastructure led them to remove, bypass, or destroy local     
facilities, rather than modifying their proprietary technology or     
products to complement the existing system. In doing so, they       
increased the cost of construction substantially, while rendering local 
technicians’ skills obsolete or irrelevant; assuring further dependence 
on the foreign vendors, if the new systems were completed. The new 
development thus excluded local artisans, merchants, and              
entrepreneurs, with many joining the growing army of the physically 
and economically displaced, and the insurgency.  
 This logic, much more than the so-frequently-mentioned   
security problems caused by ongoing insurgency, added magnitudes to 
the cost of introducing new systems. But more significantly, it meant 
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that much of the work involved dismantling or destroying functional 
or repairable facilities. Thus, even while construction proceeded, the 
ongoing degradation of the existing system continued. In practice, this 
often involved yet another decline in quality of life—with the benefits 
waiting until the completion of a new project. In more than a few   
cases, the new system failed to outperform the old system, and in 
many cases it was never successfully completed.  
 In the case of the Iraqi electrical grid, Bechtel, the U.S.     
contractor in charge of reconstruction, declared much of the decrepit 
old system (which had been preserved over the years by ingenious 
local engineers) irredeemable. Bechtel removed the old generators, 
and installed 26 new gas driven turbines slated to double the           
generating capacity. The natural gas needed to fuel the generators was, 
however, unavailable (Iraq had one small natural gas pipeline) and—
after months of delays—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers adapted 
the turbines to utilize fuel oil instead. This adaptation, however,     
reduced the turbines to 50% of capacity, making the new generators 
no more productive than the old ones they replaced. Moreover, the 
fuel oil soon caused maintenance problems that Iraqi technicians (not 
trained in either the new technology or the gerry-rigged adaptation to 
fuel oil) were unable to resolve. During the next three years, the      
turbines spent long periods off line, with an increasing number       
permanently idled as the years of misuse accumulated. Ultimately, the 
new system produced less electricity than the decrepit system it      
replaced, and far below the growing demand (SIGIR 2006; Schwartz 
2008:165f). 
 This sort of destructive development flowed naturally from 
the mismatch between U.S. contractors and the practical necessities of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to massive cost overruns, endemic 
maintenance problems, and frequent failures of completed projects 
(Chatterjee 2004,2009; Jamail 2007; Schwartz 2008; Jones 2010). The 
high probability of failure in these circumstances attracted contractors 
accustomed to exploiting the ambiguities and uncertainties of the  
situation, dubbed ‘no-bid Beltway bandits’ by journalist Ann Jones 
because they sought expensive projects without competitive bidding, 
with the intention of siphoning funds into their bottom line while 
leaving the projects undone or under-constructed (Jones 2009).  
 The sketchy regulatory presence further encouraged          
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incompetence and corruption. Neither the new indigenous            
government—with its at-best nascent administrative structure—nor 
the U.S. occupation—relying on military units untrained in             
supervising the construction of economic infrastructure—could be 
expected to supervise, regulate, and discipline the work of these profit 
seeking contractors. In Iraq, the occupation applied the neo-liberal 
principle of replacing government regulation with market discipline, 
instituting a policy of self-regulation for contractors, with no         
inspections of in-process work. The contracting agency (usually the 
military, USAID, or the Iraqi government) evaluated the work at the 
end of the project, with the only sanction for failure being a small 
monetary fine and the danger of losing the next contract to better      
performing competitors. Given the highly politicized process in   
granting such contracts, however, this threat carried almost no weight; 
the unregulated system therefore invited massive waste, inefficiency, 
and fraud, with a multitude of projects ending with all the money   
expended and few tangible results. One key element in this cycle of 
waste and corruption was the inadequacy of the overall funding, 
which became an all-purpose justification for failure, and therefore a 
perfect camouflage for the siphoning funds away from productive 
investment. 79 
 One of a multitude of such projects took place in Fallujah, 
the site of two battles in 2004 that destroyed 70% of the homes and 
most of the physical infrastructure. When the battles ended, Colonel 
John R. Ballard, a key planner for the Fallujah ‘build’ operation,           
enunciated the full COIN vision, telling the New York Times: ‘The best 
place to bring a model town into place is Fallujah.’ He promised the 
reconstructed city would be ‘a feat of social and physical                               
engineering… intended to transform a bastion of militant  anti-
Ame r i can i sm in to  a  benevo len t  and  funct iona l                                
metropolis.’ (Worth 2004; See also Schwartz 2008:114f).  
 Ballard and his colleagues decided ‘the first rebuilding project 
to win hearts and minds would be a citywide sewage treatment plant,’ 
replete with all the modern features available from the globalized 
economy (Williams 2010). But, consistent with the endemic           
underfunding of U.S. projects, $100 million was allocated to a project 
that the UN estimated would cost $250 million, with the new system 
scheduled to be completed in early 2007. On the expected completion 
65
Schwartz: Military Neoliberalism: Endless War and Humanitarian Crisis in th
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
M. Schwartz/Societies Without Borders 6:3 (2011) 190-303 
~255~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011 
date, the contractor promised completion in two more years, warning, 
however, that the finished project would serve only a third of the city. 
But even this scaled-down ambition was unfulfilled; in June, 2010, 
‘after more than six years of work, $104 million spent, and without 
having connected a single house, American reconstruction officials 
have decided to leave the troubled system only partly finished.’              
Timothy Williams of New York Times reported that the news 
‘infuriating many city residents’ (Williams 2010).  
 Underfunding was thus only part of the problem in         
Fallujah—and in other projects with similar outcomes. While UN   
estimates indicated that the $100 million allocation could have        
provided sewage for a third of the city, but instead no homes were 
ultimately served. Instead, the $100 million allocation constituted    
revenues that flowed from the U.S. treasury to politically connected 
contractors with minimal constructive impact on-the-ground in Iraq. 
(In an ironic denouement to the U.S. effort, the departing contractors 
announced that—if the Iraqi government funded its completion—the 
system they partially constructed would service only one-sixth of the 
homes in the city (Williams 2010).) 
 The construction projects funded by the United States in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq yielded, at best, marginal improvements, in 
many cases more-than-offset by the dismantling of existing             
infrastructure. All too frequently, like the sewage system in Fallujah, 
they yielded no tangible results, except the transfer of money from the 
U.S. government to the bottom line of unsupervised private          
contractors.  
 This form of higher corruption is an inevitable by-product of 
the marriage of military occupation to economic transformation. The 
combination of destructive occupation with imported, unsupervised, 
underfunded profit-seeking contractors mandated to impose a new 
society on a resistant and often well organized indigenous population 
is a recipe for corruption. Large ‘aid’ allocations delivered to politically 
connected contractors reappear in overseas bank accounts, often 
without even passing through the target society. Journalist Ann Jones, 
in discussing USAID funded projects in Afghanistan, vividly          
described this process: 
 
  Regularly, USAID now hands over huge hunks of 
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‘aid’ money to big, impossibly ambitious, quick-fix  
projects run by the usual no-bid Beltway Bandit 
contractors whose incompetence, wastefulness, 
unconscionable  profits, and outright fraud should 
be a national scandal.  
 
  This, too, is a process everyone knows but can’t 
speak about because it’s not part of the official 
script in which the U.S. must be seen as                       
developing backward Afghanistan, instead of 
sending it reeling into the darkest of ages.                
Despairing humanitarians recall that  Hillary               
Clinton promised as secretary of state to clean 
house at USAID, which, she said, had become 
nothing but ‘a contracting shop.’ Well, here’s a 
flash from Afghanistan: it’s still a contracting 
shop, and the contracts are going to the same set 
of contractors who have been exposed again and 
again as venal, fraudulent, and criminal.80 
 
 Iraq and Afghanistan are famously corrupt, ranked in 2010 at 
175 and 176 among 178 countries by Transparency International’s 
corruption index, with only Myanmor and Somalia rated more        
corrupt. Because each government participates in such spectacular 
incidents of corruption these rankings appear to be well earned     
without any contribution of the occupation. However, in terms of 
monetary magnitude, and in terms of social impact, the corruption 
originating in the intervention is magnitudes larger, and it is the      
ultimate source and sustenance of indigenous corruption. Together 
indigenous and occupation corruption are organic to the fundamental 
dynamics of what Noam Chomsky (1999) has called military                  
humanism, and fully integrated into both the pacification and                    
immiseration cycles it produces.81  
 
Markets Without Investors 
 Ultimately, the marriage of military occupation to political 
economic transformation generates immediate and degradation of 
local conditions. The promise of economic and social improvement 
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therefore relies on the privatization aspect of structural adjustment: 
attracting ample quantities of foreign capital, animated by the                 
promised-to-be-superb investment opportunities in the previously 
closed economy. This process had a quantum of validity in many 
countries that experienced structural adjustment under the leverage of 
international finance organizations.82 
 The military-primacy situation in Iraq and Afghanistan was 
supposed to follow these earlier patterns. Initial infusions of U.S.   
government funds would establish or demonstrate the viability of 
profitable investment, and would therefore (sooner, rather than later) 
be supplanted by private investment, producing efficient agricultural, 
extractive, manufacturing, or service industries equipped to compete 
in the globalized market. In 2001, USAID Director Andrew Natsios 
told Congress that the ‘transition’ of developing nations to ‘market 
economies,’ a fundamental goal of the agency’s policies, relied on 
‘leveraging private funding for our development projects’ In this     
vision, even a failing USAID effort that led to further immiseration 
could ultimately generate positive results, if its net effect was to 
‘leverage substantial private resources to achieve our development and 
foreign policy goals’ (Natsios 2001).  
 This vision had a certain plausible logic in Iraq, with its 115 
billion barrels of proven, but largely undeveloped, oil reserves.    
However, in the first seven years of the occupation, the lure of Iraqi 
oil did not attract private investment; and it therefore did not generate 
the anticipated immediate stimulation of increased oil production (and 
its anticipated flood of revenues). An even more important failure 
may have been the fact that the dearth of oil investment meant a 
dearth of investment in the roads, electrical generation, and secondary 
industry that oil development was expected to inspire, and which 
would have (could have) re-employed the multitudes of newly       
unemployed, and would have (could have) rehabilitated needed      
services to the immiserated residents of the country. 83 
 This failure, in the most propitious of circumstances,         
illustrates the more general problem with expecting military humanism 
to be the engine for market driven economic revival. Immediately   
after the fall of the Hussein regime, with trade barriers removed, U.S. 
and European imports did arrive in substantial quantities, supplying 
the Iraqi middle class with products never-before-available, including 
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cell phones, air conditioners, and various other electric and electronic 
commodities. If such sales had been sustained over a several-year  
period, they might have motivated investment in assembly and      
production plants to serve the ongoing market for these and other 
staples of the global economy. This moment, however, soon passed 
when structural adjustment swept through the Iraqi economy.  
 By the winter of 2003, the newly installed U.S. occupation 
government, led by L. Paul Bremer, had administered a particularly 
drastic form of neoliberal ‘shock treatment’ that could not have been 
possible without the military conquest that allowed for the total      
annihilation of the Hussein government. Bremer’s initial masterstroke 
involved shutting down 192 government-owned enterprises         
comprising 35% of the economy, a move justified by the promise that 
the state subsidized goods and services provided by these inefficient 
enterprises would be replaced by superior imports, and—in the     
medium term—manufacturing plants assembling these products    
inside Iraq.84 This draconian measure gave concrete expression to 
what President George W. Bush would later characterize as the 
‘reforms needed to transition from a command-and-control economy 
to a modern market-based system’ (Bush 2008).  
 The resulting unemployment and economic decline was    
amplified by the demise of enterprises that supplied or were supplied 
by the state-owned firms, producing a massive depression that        
engulfed the country, with unemployment rates reaching as high as 
60%. This sudden and drastic change generated all manner of        
protest: demonstrations, strikes, and protest marches; subsistence and 
criminal looting; and demands for services by local tribal and religious 
leaders (or ad hoc governments that had arose in the administrative 
vacuum); and a surge in violent attacks against occupation forces 
(Schwartz 2008). 
 This atmosphere was anathema to outside investment. While 
U.S. and European firms continued to ship products into Iraq (in  
decreasing amounts as the economy declined), they had zero incentive 
to invest in production or service facilities. Any such investment 
would be beyond risky: the immediate prospects were negative, and 
their long term viability would depend upon the both economy      
reviving and the rebellion subsiding. It is not surprising that, as he 
prepared to leave office in 2008, President Bush would say that the 
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transition was going to ‘take more time’ (Bush 2008).  
 
 Even oil could not attract investment capital. The one exception to 
this negative investment climate could have been the Iraqi petroleum 
industry, which largely escaped the induced depression, since the 
Bremer regime chose not to shutter core state-owned enterprises    
associated with oil.85 By the fall of 2003, he had announced major 
changes in Iraqi law that would allow international oil companies to 
take proprietary control of Iraqi oil fields for 20 to 30 years (under 
what are called Production Sharing Contracts), an arrangement that 
would give the oil companies, and not the Iraqi government, control 
of development decisions and levels of production (Ehrenberg et al 
2010:384-6,390-400). These sorts of opportunities no longer existed in 
the world of oil, because state-owned oil firms controlled virtually all 
accessible oil exploitation, and because there were few virgin oil fields 
of the size waiting for exploitation in Iraq. Nevertheless, no major or 
minor oil company stepped forward to accept Bremer’s offer.  
 The answer to this lack of interest was altogether too simple, 
and fully expressive of the fallacy in marrying military conquest with 
economic transformation. The development of these oil fields would 
require billions of dollars, and no responsible company would invest 
such vast sums in a location where the entire investment could be lost 
without compensation.  
 The immediate threat lay in international law, which requires 
an occupying power to leave the basic law of the occupied country 
untouched.86 Bremer’s oil policy was therefore illegal under              
international law, since he had abrogated the entire corpus of Iraqi 
hydrocarbon law, including the requirements that the government 
administer oil commerce and that the (non-existent) parliament      
endorse all contracts. While Bremer promised that the soon-to-be-
created Iraqi government would validate any negotiated contracts, the 
oil companies were not going to risk their billions until they could deal 
with a sovereign government that could credibly guarantee the        
security of their investment.  
 Having destroyed the Hussein government as part of the 
transformational agenda, the occupation could not quickly create a 
satisfactory partner for the oil companies. Even after the formal    
transfer of sovereignty to the newly formed Iraqi government, all 
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manner of obstacles arose.  
 During the next five years, industry confidence in the                        
capacity of the various governments installed in Baghdad (first headed 
by Iyad Allawi, later by Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nouri al-Maliki) to   
guarantee the security of production sharing contracts was repeatedly 
called into question by resistance emanating from many quarters. The 
labor movement, vivified by the fall of the Hussein regime, vigorously 
opposed such contracts, utilizing strikes and demonstrations to deter 
them. The newly formed Iraqi government therefore faced a viable 
threat that the arrival of foreign firms would trigger paralyzing strikes 
in the oil industry and other sectors that served it.  
 In the meantime, the insurgency, rooted in areas containing 
oil extraction, refining, and transportation facilities, interrupted      
production or siphoned off crude oil in response to policies friendly 
to the U.S. efforts; creating a credible threat of full-scale disruption of 
any ambitious development project (Schwartz 2006a). Local tribal and 
religious leadership, rising into the vacuum created by the collapsed 
national government, mobilized against the oil policy, demanding that 
local government controls employment, nominate subcontractors, and 
be delivered a share of the oil revenues. The Iraqi Oil Ministry,               
virtually the only administrative apparatus that survived (in a much 
diminished form) the U.S. dismantling of the Hussein government, 
demanded continued control of oil development, refusing to transfer 
administrative responsibility to international oil companies. The      
parliament insisted on the right to veto all proposed contracts,      
promising to refuse any contract that ceded decision-making to non-
Iraqi oil firms.  
 Ultimately even Prime Minister Maliki withdrew his          
endorsement of the proposed contracts and authorized his oil minister 
to offer much less favorable contracts designed to preserve Iraqi    
government control over the oil fields and their development. Even 
these modified contracts generated ferocious Iraqi opposition that 
could prevent their activation.87 
 The negotiation of several small production sharing oil      
contracts between the Kurdish regional government and minor    
transnational oil companies underscored the effectiveness of this 
complex of opposition forces. The firms involved understood this to 
be a risky investment, but the stability of the Kurdish regional        
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government gave them confidence that the contracts would ultimately 
be honored.88 Nevertheless, the contracts ran afoul of institutional    
resistance within the newly formed Iraq government, which declared 
them illegally negotiated and therefore invalid. Only two of the      
contracts were activated, but when the newly developed oil fields   
began operating, the companies did not receive compensation for 
their investments, because the oil pipelines that carried the oil passed 
through Iraq proper. Neither the insurgency—which repeatedly                
sabotaged the pipeline or siphoned off oil—nor the national                       
government—which collected the revenues from the sale of the oil, 
acknowledged any obligation to the oil companies. In 2010, neither of 
the oil companies had retrieved the many millions of dollars invested 
in exploration and development (Schwartz 2010; IOR 2010).  
 Seven years after the U.S. invasion, no major oil investment 
had yet occurred, and the vivification of the Iraqi economy remained a 
distant promise with no substance. If the incredible value of Iraqi oil 
(worth at least $10 trillion) could not attract foreign investment, then 
there was little prospect for investment in an ordinary country like 
Afghanistan (even with its hypothesized one trillion in mineral riches).  
The underlying logic of the Iraqi experience illuminates the lack of 
substance to the premise of the U.S. government that post-invasion     
societies can ‘leverage substantial private resources to achieve our   
development and foreign policy goals.’ The consequences of        
combining military occupation with dismantling the indigenous regime 
and then attempting to enact structural adjustment guarantees an              
immiserated population in localities with no legitimate governmental 
presence, organized into various forms of institutional or violent          
resistance. The economic degradation destroys the sorts of ready-
markets that could motivate early investment. The absence of a viable 
government undermines any guarantees that investment will be              
protected long enough to return a profit. The multifaceted resistance 
includes many tendencies that view such investment as a threat to 
their resources, power, or way of life. No companies with even a    
rudimentary understanding of their own self-interest will risk         
substantial amounts of capital in such a setting.  
 Ultimately, the marriage of military conquest and social   
transformation produces the ongoing degradation of local life for as 
long as the project continues; at the same time it generates wave after 
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wave of resistance, operating in a variety of venues, with a variety of 
strategies, and in a variety of social strata.  
 
PART V - THE RESILIENCE OF RESISTANCE 
 The concentric cycles of pacification and immiseration      
encompass the active role of local communities and individuals. Civil 
society within villages, towns, and cities initiates its own projects at 
various moments. The activists energizing these efforts may seek to 
directly rebuild lives and/or infrastructure injured by kinetic military 
action; they may demand support for these efforts from the            
government or the occupation, or expect help from the human rights 
regime; or they may become involved in various forms of passive, 
active, or violent resistance aimed at frustrating any or all of elements 
in the ‘clear, hold, and build’ cycle. 
 The nature of this response varies among individuals and 
communities, as well as evolving during the various iterations of    
violence and reconstruction. This variation determines, to a            
considerable degree, whether the pacification and immiseration cycles 
might be broken.  
 The following processes are integral to the nature and         
trajectory of human agency at the local levels: 
 
 Destitution, Displacement, and Humanitarian Crisis. 
Without the intervention of human agency, the 
destination of the pacification and immiseration 
cycles is the threat or reality of destitution for 
large portions of the local population, with little 
hope for corrective intervention from the human 
rights regime. This threat, combined with the          
ongoing onslaught of kinetic military and                  
destructive development, creates the conditions 
for temporary or—more significantly—long term 
displacement, either in neighboring communities 
or neighboring countries At some point, this    
combination of destitution and displacement may 
lead the human rights regime to designate the      
calamity as a humanitarian crisis.  
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 The Painful Diversity of Resistance. Collective                
resistance can express itself in a variety of                      
modalities, with local activism migrating from one 
form to another in response to the pacification 
cycle, to the changing social and physical                    
conditions, and to the changing organization and 
material resources available. Ethnic conflict,              
terrorism, and black market drug cultivation are 
among the formats emergent in Iraq and                    
Afghanistan, along with more straightforward  
modalities including attacks on occupation armed 
forces, sabotage and capture of economic                   
facilities, and non-violent resistance ranging from 
union work action to institutional resistance              
within ad hoc or formal local, regional and even 
national government units.  
 
 The Tide of Resistance. Transformational                              
military-primary intervention cannot achieve                
sustained quiescence in the subject population, 
even in settings where oppressive predecessor 
regimes had successfully imposed such passivity. 
This contrast derives from two factors:successful 
indigenous authoritarian regimes have a strong 
administrative presence across their domain, and 
they exploit, rather than transform, the local social 
and economic structure. These factors work to 
suppress resistance and make immiseration            
discontinuous. Military humanism, in contrast, 
annihilates the indigenous government and               
embarks on destructive development, thus                 
presenting a panorama of continuous                          
immiseration while depriving itself and its client 
regime of the administrative controls that might 
contain the resulting agitation. In this setting, the 
ebb and flow of resistance is marked by repeated 
crescendos.  
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Destitution, Displacement, and Humanitarian Crisis 
 For as long as the occupation continues to pursue the dual 
goals of military conquest and socio-economic transformation, the 
condition of local populations continues to decline. There can be no 
turning point (without the withdrawal of the occupying army), since 
both repacification and destructive development must necessarily   
generate further immiseration.  
 People faced with the threat or reality of destitution act to 
protect themselves or their families. These efforts can be either       
individual or collective, and within these modalities either passive or 
active, peaceful or violent. Individual action can include attempting to 
outwait the chaotic storm while working to sustain daily rounds; it can 
involve searching for new opportunities arising in the chaos, including 
(among some) predatory activities like robbery, kidnapping, or       
extortion; or it can lead to migration to distant locations with hoped-
for better opportunities. Typically, there are individuals and families in 
any locality willing to try any of these options (and others), in various 
combinations.  
 The collective modality may also take many forms. All      
disasters generate ad hoc community-energized reconstruction       
efforts.89 These efforts mobilize the existing or emergent               
organizational capacity of civil society; in Iraq and Afghanistan these 
typically derived from tribal and/or religious formations, as well as 
remnants or reconstituted administrative elements of the ousted    
regime. Among other initiatives, these formations typically demand 
resources from the occupation or the newly installed political regime 
to fuel their reconstitutive (and/or predatory) efforts; or from the   
human rights regime, which might be mobilized around the potential 
(or already realized) crisis. In cases of military humanism like Iraq and             
Afghanistan, these projects often clash with the transformative     
agenda, and this contradiction may hinder or doom local                
reconstruction—or it may trigger increased violence.  
 When non-contentious collective efforts are unsuccessful, 
they tend to generate various forms of protest demanding additional 
resources or—where relevant—calling for the withdrawal of the    
occupation. Since even peaceful protest is a dangerous challenge to 
the fragile or absent legitimacy of the occupation and its client regime, 
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such protest—especially when it can be categorized as terrorism—is 
likely to trigger a new cycle of pacification, including the sort of     
punitive kinetic violence that is the hallmark of disputed sovereignty 
(Bjork 2010).  
 The mélange of individual and collective response to the   
immiseration cycle creates a kind of strategic stalemate that prevents 
either side—the occupation or the mostly local post-invasion         
formations—from enacting its agenda. At the national level, the    
occupation generally prevails: its military victory results in the        
installation of a regime with compliant leaders willing to (rhetorically 
at least) endorse the occupation and its transformational project.     
Despite propitious beginnings, however, neither the occupation nor 
the new government has an administrative presence in small villages, 
towns or urban neighborhoods, and therefore cannot impose its new 
program on the communities where ordinary people live. Ambitious 
programs, even oil drilling or electrical power stations, depend upon 
pacified local areas hosting the projects. For this reason, these large 
projects require the invasion of various areas in an attempt to apply 
the ‘clear, hold, and build’ strategy—one locality at a time—until a 
large stable area could be created capable of hosting these national 
initiatives. These efforts typically fail, but even when they succeed—as 
in Fallujah, where the devastation produced (temporarily) a quiescent 
community—the transformative reconstruction cannot create        
sustained on-the-ground progress. Instead, even unchallenged     
transformational reconstruction produces underfunding, corruption, 
and failure, exemplified by the aborted reconstruction in Fallujah and 
other projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
  At the same time, the local formations are also unable to  
implement their own reconstruction.90 Most neighborhoods and      
communities are left to themselves as the occupation military operates 
elsewhere, and, therefore in principle, could choose—individually or 
collectively—to build or rebuild according to their own taste and 
goals—or rather according to the taste and goals of those who emerge 
as locally dominant. In the Sunni areas of Iraq, for example, these new 
formations usually reflected tribal, religious, and Ba'athist tendencies, 
sometimes mixed together and other times with one force emerging as 
dominant (Schwartz 2008).91 Such reconstruction efforts were          
inevitably dependent on commerce, supplies, and funding from      
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outside the community; and these resources were by-and-large not 
available in the debilitated political economy in Iraq. Locally-based 
reconstruction was therefore limited to minimal efforts aimed at     
preventing destitution as the economy wallowed in depression. Those 
communities that attracted regime-initiated pacification efforts      
suffered further decline and/or further transformative reconstruction 
efforts initiated by the occupation.  
 But even those areas that rarely saw or experienced a kinetic 
military presence could not lift themselves up. Many Shia cities south 
of Baghdad were never the site of pacification battles, and yet their 
economies slipped further and further into destitution as the weight of 
neoliberal transformation at the national level and the continued     
military campaigns, located elsewhere but affecting the country as a 
whole, led to the decay of commerce and infrastructure at the local 
level, and robbed them of needed economic foundations (Schwartz 
2008). Even in Iraqi Kurdistan, where there was no fighting and no 
U.S. military presence, economic decline proceeded apace as the     
collapse of the larger economy deprived localities of the resources 
needed for sustenance (Schwartz 2008). One palpable sign of Kurdish 
destitution was the sweeping cholera epidemic in 2007, a disease that 
reflects malnutrition, contaminated water, and inadequate medical care 
(Lando 2007; Aljazeera 2007; UNHCR,2007).  
 The continued presence of the occupation with its           
counterinsurgency strategy aimed at transformation thus guarantees 
the continued immiseration of the indigenous residents, whether or 
not they mount a disruptive or violent resistance campaign. In areas 
without a military presence, the lack of economic viability means an 
ongoing struggle with increasingly desperate adaptations as             
immiseration proceeds. Disorganized communities suffer from     
predatory criminality and other pathologies that further contribute to 
local decline. Proto-governments can range in their responsiveness to 
local needs, from oppressive warlords or religious tyrants to           
responsive collective leadership. The former may impose further    
depredations that serve their interest; the latter may ameliorate      
conditions. Both are likely to mobilize demands for needed resources 
from the occupation or the national government. In these              
circumstances, they may attract the kinetic attention of the occupation 
military and, perhaps, debilitating reconstruction, instituting another 
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cycle of immiseration. 
 At some point in this cycle the local area may become      
temporarily or permanently uninhabitable, triggering displacement 
and/or destitution for the local residents. When enough localities   
suffer this fate, the human rights regime may acknowledge a          
humanitarian crisis, since displacement is the high profile human 
rights condition most likely to attract international attention.  
 With or without such acknowledgment, the human rights   
regime, elaborately constructed in the last 40 years of the twentieth 
century, may enact a (non-military) humanitarian intervention aimed at 
ameliorating conditions in the impacted regions. The infernal logic of 
the pacification cycle, however, makes the delivery of ameliorative aid 
problematic at best. 92 
 
 The sometimes constant threat or presence of 
violence circumscribes or prevents the operation 
of both UN agencies and NGOs, the mainstays of 
humanitarian aid. In these insecure areas, major 
humanitarian efforts are rarely mounted. 
 
 In pacified locations, the occupation may welcome 
human rights activism, but only under the rubric 
of its policies and prescriptions, including its 
transformational agenda; such constrained                  
conditions often preclude ameliorative aid to 
many local initiatives (Duffield 2001). In addition 
to constricting the distribution of aid that might 
stem the tide of immiseration, these constraints 
may lead local residents to identify humanitarian 
NGOs with the occupation. Aid organizations 
may then become targets of the insurgency,               
adding a military threat to their functioning.  
 
 In relatively peaceful areas without a military      
presence (and perhaps a strong insurgent                   
presence), NGO and UN activism is often barred 
by the occupation, if it sees humanitarian aid as 
providing aid and comfort to the insurgency, or 
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contributing to anti-transformational formations. 
In other settings, the resistance itself is hostile to 
the human rights regime, viewing the various 
groups as agents of the occupation and/or the 
incumbent regime. 
 
 The various combinations of these factors lead 
many humanitarian organizations to withhold or 
withdraw aid, seeing involvement as either too 
dangerous or as a compromise of their neutrality, 
since such participation would force them to                
support one side or the other of the ongoing               
confrontation.  
 
 In other humanitarian crises, caused by natural disasters and 
even internal wars, the delivery of ameliorative or preventive aid is 
fraught with logistic, political, and resource difficulties. Even so, the 
human rights regime has become a formidable force in the globalized 
world, accounting (by the beginning of the twenty-first century) for at 
least half of all humanitarian aid (Duffield 2001:53). In the setting of 
military humanism, however, the barriers to delivery are far more 
daunting, and in many instances the human rights regime has        
contented itself with measuring the extent of the crisis. 
 This impotence was illustrated by the bombing of the UN 
relief headquarters in Iraq in August 2003, killing 22 staff members, 
including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello. The insurgent groups involved accused the 
United Nations (and its associated NGOs) of complicity with the   
occupation and followed the bombing with assaults on other elements 
of the humanitarian regime in Iraq, including a second attack on UN 
headquarters. By late September, the United Nations had withdrawn 
over 90% of its 600 member staff, a drastic downsizing matched by 
other major human rights groups.  
 While the UN did not formally withdraw from Afghanistan, it 
adopted a policy of reducing staff levels (and associated NGOs) in 
regions where security was an issue, severely compromising the      
viability of relief efforts (BBC 2003; Guardian 2009; Global Security 
2011). 93 Iraq and Afghanistan can be counted among the many     
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conflict zones in which, as Nash (2011) has argued, humanitarian 
NGOs have been unable to cushion the direct and indirect impact of 
sustained military campaigns. Eventually the most visible presence of 
the HRR in both countries were reports on various human rights    
issues (UNHCR 2007; UNODC 2010), while the process of                 
immiseration continued unabated.  
 
The Diversity of Resistance 
 There are myriad forms to collective resistance. While all are 
directed at a perceived source of immiseration, the candidates for  
culpability are hopelessly diverse. Depending on the specific          
circumstances, and the various forces within the host society, differing 
targets and strategies emerge. These reactive strategies can be                   
pro-active or reactive, constructive or destructive, violent or non-
violent, focused or unfocused.  
 In considering the resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 
have so far gestured at the daily drumbeat of pro-active construction 
focused on local rebuilding, and on its contradictions with occupation 
actions and policy. We now consider two key patterns found in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and which exemplify the variety of responses, both 
in their targets and their impact on the pacification/immiseration   
cycles.  
 The expectation of occupation and government leaders that 
the victims of immiseration will quietly accept their fate cannot be 
fulfilled. At least in the middle term, quiescence is always temporary 
because passivity does not interrupt the process of immiseration. The 
grinding degradation of conditions generates new humanitarian 
threats, with local residents seeing their families suffering from       
debilitating conditions threatening to destroy their own or their     
children’s future, or take their lives. This sort of calamity forces those 
enmeshed in these cycles to seek new solutions, sometimes individual, 
sometimes collective, usually peaceful, often disruptive, and        
sometimes violent.  
 Within these ongoing struggles lies a set of patterns that     
coalesce into collective action as the immiseration process proceeds 
and the occupation’s various strategies fail to pacify the country. The 
impossibility of stationing troops everywhere guarantees that         
suppressed local efforts will repeatedly revive, and in some places 
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begin to mature into stable local structures with sustained programs. 
These local efforts may vary in their responsiveness to local            
conditions and need, producing predatory criminality, religious      
jihadism, and brutal local warlords as well as organic local leadership 
with programs having the potential to serve local interests. Those   
efforts may provide the promise of an answer to the most pressing 
local needs for a modicum of livable resources and a hope for future 
demiseration; or they can further undermine the future prospects of 
the people they promise to serve.  
 
 Oil industry activism: an example of constructive destruction. The     
pre-existing or newly created civil society formations that coordinate 
these initiatives episodically coalesce around specific struggles. This 
coalescence may create horizontal networks among several or many 
communities, or reach upward in church hierarchies or local          
governments, sometimes operating at the level of national politics.  
 Transferring control of Iraqi petroleum production to       
international oil companies was an ongoing goal of the occupation, 
initiated soon after L. Paul Bremer ascended to the position of        
pro-consul. The resistance to this effort began inside the oil industry 
itself, among administrators, technicians, and workers employed by 
the state-owned oil companies.94 
 In one dramatic episode, Bremer announced transferring   
control of the southern port of Basra (which then handled 80% of the 
country’s oil exports) from a state-run enterprise to KBR, then a    
subsidiary of Halliburton, the company Vice President Cheney had 
once headed (Chatterjee 2009). Anticipating that their own jobs would 
soon disappear in a sea of imported labor, the oil workers immediately 
struck, paralyzing the port for three days. KBR withdrew from its 
newly signed contract, and Bremer abandoned the effort, restoring 
administration to the government agency that had run the harbor for 
decades. This early resistance thus frustrated one prong of the       
neoliberalization effort (Bacon 2005; Schwartz 2006b).  
 Though Bremer was unable to transfer control of whole oil 
fields or primary exploration to international oil companies, he did 
sign narrower short term contracts with various non-Iraqi energy and 
construction firms for repair or development of specific areas or    
facilities. The results were rarely adequate and often destructive,    
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reflecting both the ineffectiveness of outside contractors and the    
resourcefulness of the Iraqis who opposed the use of outside        
companies. Contracts for infrastructure repair or renewal were often 
botched or left incomplete, as international companies ripped out   
usable or repairable facilities that involved technology alien to them, 
and installed new, but often incompatible, equipment that            
compromised the functioning elements of the old system. In one   
instance, a $5 million pipeline repair became an $80 million 
‘modernization’ project that foundered on intractable engineering  
issues and, three years later, was left incomplete (Glanz 2006). In 
more than a few instances, local communities actively sabotaged such 
projects, either because the contractors insisted on utilizing foreign 
technicians and workers instead of hiring Iraqis, or because the            
reconstruction would deprive the locals of what they considered their 
‘fair share’ of oil revenues.  
 After an initial flurry of interest, international oil companies 
sized up the dangers of the situation and politely refused Bremer’s 
invitation—and the subsequent efforts by Iraqi governments—to risk 
billions of dollars on Iraqi energy investments.  
 After this initial failure, the Bush administration sought a new 
strategy to implement its oil ambitions. In late 2004, with Bremer out 
of the picture, Washington brokered a deal between U.S.-appointed 
interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the International      
Monetary Fund (IMF) in which European countries promised to   
forgive 25% of the debts accumulated by Saddam Hussein, and the 
Iraqis promised to implement the U.S. oil plan that would deliver oil 
field decision-making and operational control to international oil 
firms. This worked no better than Bremer’s earlier effort. Continued 
sabotage by insurgents, continued resistance by Iraqi technicians and 
workers, and the continued corrupt ineptitude of the contracting   
companies involved in development work made progress impossible. 
The international oil companies continued to stay away (Al-Ali 2004).  
 In 2007, under direct U.S. pressure, the third Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Nouri al-Maliki forwarded virtually the same U.S.-authored 
policy to the Iraqi parliament for legislative consideration. Instead of 
passing the law, the Parliament established itself as a new center of 
resistance to the U.S. plan—raising myriad (already familiar)          
complaints and repeatedly refusing to bring it to a vote (Susman 
82
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol6/iss3/3
M. Schwartz/Societies Without Borders 6:3 (2011) 190-303 
~272~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2011 
2007).  
 The stalemate continued unabated through the first year of 
the Obama administration, exemplified by the continuing conflict 
around the pipeline that carried oil from Iraq to Turkey, a source of 
about 20% of oil revenues (Lando 2009). During the Bremer         
administration, the U.S. had ended the Saddam era tradition of      
allowing tribal and other local leaders to siphon off a proportion of 
the oil passing through their territory, with the resulting revenues    
percolating through their communities. The occupation attempted to 
prevent this siphoning with the only weapon available—the           
occupation army—triggering innumerable firefights and retaliatory 
actions against oil pipelines. The ongoing political and military battles 
became an ongoing source of sustenance for both the political and 
violent resistance in the many communities involved.  
 In localities where the U.S. was successful in preventing the 
siphoning, the impacted communities fought back in various ways 
against what they saw as theft of their rightful resources, by the     
United States and its allies in the national government. Tribal leaders 
and other locals served by the siphoning process, under the banner of 
the insurgency, began systematic sabotage, a process facilitated by the 
hundreds of miles of almost-impossible-to-guard pipelines. By 2007, 
the insurgency had mounted 600 successful attacks against oil       
pipelines and facilities (Francis 2007; Brookings 2009:22).  
 Despite ferocious—often punitive—U.S. military offensives 
aimed at pacifying the communities deemed responsible, the northern 
pipeline remained closed for all but a few days in the six years from 
2003 to 2009. The line was re-opened in fall 2009 when the Iraqi   
government, breaking free from U.S. discipline, restored the Saddam 
era custom of allowing local siphoning in exchange for discontinued 
sabotage. Shipments were nevertheless regularly interrupted as more 
militant fractions among the insurgency undertook 26 attacks on   
pipelines during the first three months after the agreement, based on 
their claim that the oil was illegitimately funding the continuing U.S. 
occupation. Attacks continued at a slower pace thereafter, rendering 
the pipeline inoperative for substantial periods of time (Lando 2010; 
Iraq Oil Report 2010). 
 The multifaceted resistance to the U.S.-sponsored oil policy 
illustrates the inevitability, tenacity, and diversity of the resistance to 
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the U.S. efforts to utilize military means to transform Iraqi, Afghan, or 
other targets of U.S. foreign policy. In the context of continued      
military occupation, such resistance takes its place as a part of the   
pacification cycle, becoming both provocation and justification for 
renewed, continued, or amplified military offensives that close the 
circle on another round of immiseration. At the same time, however, 
it can be counted as constructive, since it worked to frustrate the 
Bremer policy of delivering the oil to the international market       
economy, a process, which if enacted, would have contributed       
substantially to the debilitation of the Iraqi economy as a whole, and 
to the welfare of the localities that had been nurtured by the old    
distribution system.  
 One can conclude that the sabotage of the pipelines and            
other actions designed to frustrate U.S. oil policy was a form of                
constructive destruction, with all its dialectical imagery. Insofar as it 
limited oil  revenues and therefore reduced resources that might have 
been used to ameliorate misery, it was destructive. Insofar as it                  
frustrated the transformational agenda and thus interfered with the 
immiseration cycle, it was constructive. Insofar as it led to new rounds 
of pacification and immiseration, it was destructive. Insofar as it led 
the occupation to modulate its military or transformational                   
ambitions—or contemplate withdrawal—is was constructive.  
 
 Parasitic activism. Not all collective resistance is constructive, 
even in the dialectical sense just discussed. In many instances, the 
grinding immiseration process set in motion by military humanism can        
exacerbate fault lines within the host society, focusing resistance in 
ways that contribute to the immiseration process. In Iraq, ethnic and 
religious divisions defined one such nexus of conflict. Beyond the 
long-standing history of Arab-Kurd confrontation, Shia-Sunni        
friction, which had not produced violence in 1000 years, devolved 
into terrorism and ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. It is important 
to note and understand the causal vectors that connect the             
pacification/immiseration cycles with this ethnic conflict, a significant 
instance of parasitic activism.95 
 As the impact of the occupation’s military actions and its   
economic program penetrated the various communities,               
guerrilla-based violent resistance began to proliferate, expressing itself 
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as small engagements, sniper attacks, and strategically placed          
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—most aimed at stalling or    
diverting occupation incursions into insurgent neighborhoods. This 
guerrilla-type resistance accounted for the vast majority of the tens of 
thousands of engagements between the occupation and the            
insurgency.96 At first, residents of Sunni and Shia cities saw their local 
efforts as part of a larger joint struggle against the occupation, a       
solidarity that reached a high water mark when numbers of Shia     
insurgents left their communities to join the Sunni insurgents in the 
first battle of Fallujah.  
 By 2005, however, motivated by increasingly oppressive    
economic conditions, young Shia men joined the relatively well-paid, 
U.S.-commanded Iraqi army, and were assigned to campaigns against 
Sunni resistance fighters. A key moment occurred when units of Shia 
soldiers were ordered into the brutal second battle of Fallujah, and 
then remained to participate in the violent policing of the still         
rebellious population in the months after the fighting was over (see 
above; Schwartz 2006a).  
 From the beginning of the U.S. occupation, a tiny segment of 
the Iraqi Sunni community had resonated with the appeal of jihadist 
groups, who advocated terrorist attacks on the (mainly Shia) civilian 
supporters of the U.S.-led occupation. This appeal gained momentum 
in 2004 when the first elected government of Iraq, dominated by Shia 
politicians, provided rhetorical, legislative, and military support for the 
various occupation offensives against the growing Sunni-based        
insurgency. The destructive second battle of Fallujah, the first in 
which Shia troops participated, marked an inflection point for Sunni 
jihadist terrorist violence. The millions of outraged victims and       
witnesses to the slaughter led to a dramatic increase of willing martyrs. 
This led to the rising tide of car bombs and suicide attacks, aimed at 
‘soft’ civilian targets that were considered gathering places for (mainly 
Shia) supporters of the occupation. Though the jihadists never      
accounted for more than 5% of the activists engaging in violent     
resistance and their attacks against civilian targets never accounted for 
more a tiny fraction of the insurgent military attacks (never more than 
10%) and a small proportion of the more than one million civilian 
casualties during the years of heavy fighting, their (occasional) high 
mortality counts led the international media to make them the       
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centerpiece of news coverage for the next five years (Phillips and Roth 
2008:20-24; Schwartz 2008).  
 As jihadist bombings increased in 2005, other forms of     
sectarian violence also began to develop, including ethnic cleansing. 
One vector in this development derived from the second battle of 
Fallujah. The forced evacuation of the city during the fighting,        
combined with the failure of reconstruction, produced about 100,000 
displaced residents, most of whom migrated to already crowded   
Baghdad neighborhoods. The disorganization of these neighborhoods 
(based on the dismantling of the Hussein regime) became the enabling 
foundation for the Fallujah refugees to resolve their                       
occupation-created homelessness by driving out Shia residents and 
taking possession of their vacated homes. By late 2005, this new form 
of reactive violence had gained momentum, fueled by the growing 
number of Sunnis displaced by fighting in various cities, and by the 
growing conviction among (still a tiny proportion of) Sunnis that    
retaliation against Shia supporters of the government and participation 
in the pacification was justified and/or necessary.  
 These various expressions of collective response to the      
pacification/immiseration cycles in Sunni communities then became a 
casual vector in evolving activism in the Shia areas of the country.97 
During a year of intense suicide and car bomb attacks, and a growing 
tide of ethnic cleansing in mixed Baghdad neighborhoods, Shia civil 
society and religious organizations directed their (violent and non-
violent) collective action at the occupation and its client government, 
demanding an end to occupation offensives and destructive           
development as well as protection against terrorist attacks.  
 By 2006, however, Shia groups began redirecting their       
activism against the Sunni community. The most visible of these      
initiatives were the death squads originally organized by U.S. military 
officers but later operating autonomously both inside and outside the 
Iraqi police system.98 The death squads invaded Sunni communities, 
often under cover of official police business, and captured, tortured 
and displayed the bodies of suspected insurgents. These death squads 
soon became the vanguard of the Shia side of ethnic cleansing.      
Targeted death squad attacks, often supplemented by U.S. military 
operations, drove Sunni families from targeted neighborhoods,      
replacing them with displaced Shia families.  
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 This cycle of hatred, multiplied hundreds of times in various 
combinations, was the building block for the Sunni-Shia violence that 
wracked Baghdad in 2006-2008, causing—in conjunction with a series 
of ferocious U.S. military offensives aimed at ‘insurgent              
strongholds’ (including the much publicized ‘surge’)—the              
displacement of about 1,000,000 (mainly Sunni) Baghdad residents 
and the death of tens of thousands (Schwartz, 2008). The violence 
only ended when ethnic cleansing was more-or-less complete, with the 
previously integrated city locked into ethnic enclaves, and a large    
proportion of the defeated Sunnis driven from their homes and 
crowded into micro ghettos or displaced to other provinces or      
countries. In some sense, this massive humanitarian disaster           
represented a monstrous struggle over scarce resources needed for 
survival under the extreme immiseration generated by the ongoing 
effort of the United States to transform Iraq into an outpost for U.S. 
led-globalization. 
 This elaborate nexus of local collective action deepened the 
immiseration process throughout Baghdad: commerce ceased and   
residents fled, leaving behind isolated and dysfunctional communities 
incapable of sustaining the remaining population. In this sense, the 
nexus of terrorist attacks and ethnic cleansing were parasitic—
contributing to the pacification/immiseration cycle by adding new 
dimensions of violence while deepening immiseration. 
  In Afghanistan, the physical separation of Pashtun from other 
ethnic groups made sectarian violence less likely and less prevalent. 
But other forms of parasitic activism evolved out of the immiseration 
dynamics developed there. When NATO arrived in late 2001, opium 
cultivation was at an historically low ebb, constituting a tiny fraction 
of the economy. But the ensuing cycle of degradation made existing 
crops impossible to profitably cultivate, while giving unique           
advantages to opium, which could be processed into an easily carried 
form, and transported out of the country by non-mechanized means. 
It became the only viable crop, but it brought with it the criminal   
culture that further oppressed local residents, even while they        
embraced its cultivation (McCoy 2010; UNODC 2010; Prupis 2011).  
 The opium economy and its attendant criminality very quickly 
became the material foundation for Afghan resistance to the           
occupation, including the various groups loosely affiliated under the 
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‘Taliban’ banner, at least in the eyes of the western media. Opium   
cultivating communities were particularly resilient to the episodic   
incursions of NATO troops, and therefore the occupation worked 
with the Northern Alliance, a group of locally based warlords who 
were skilled at establishing and sustaining a dominant presence within 
the various regions of the countries. In areas where the members of 
the Northern Alliance had a social base, they could—strengthened by 
U.S. supplied resources—purge the local resistance. They did not, 
however, eliminate the opium trade, which was too lucrative and too 
essential to the local economy to attempt its suppression. This       
ascendance of the Northern Alliance also facilitated the re-imposition 
of the various pathologies associated with Afghan warlordism,       
including the extreme sexism that is most often associated with the 
Taliban, but is also a hallmark of the Northern Alliance.99 
 The evolution of collective resistance is constrained by the 
vectors of causality created by the pacification/immiseration cycles 
and by the particularities of the localities in which it develops. It is in 
the nature of the sorts of military-primary interventions discussed here 
that the individual and collective resistance will percolate upward from 
specific communities and only find broadly based consistency as an 
emergent phenomenon. The elaborate nature of this process and the 
causal contingencies that impact upon it explain the immense range 
found within and between countries. What unites the locally based 
strikes against newly enacted oil policies, agricultural initiatives in 
farming communities, IED attacks on patrolling military forces, and 
ethnic cleansing of communities is that they all arise in response to the 
grinding process of immiseration that emanates from the pacification 
cycle. 
 
The Rising Tide of Resistance 
 Ordinary working people can and do passively absorb       
oppression for long periods without engaging in contentious         
resistance. Collective activism—no matter what form it takes—is the 
contra-positive of such passivity. In the context of military humanism, 
the engine of such resistance is the prospect of continuous             
degradation. As soon as people feel that inaction will guarantee       
further immiseration and that failure to act will threaten the lives of 
their family and children, they will then take action to prevent this 
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definitive calamity. If this first response does not end the continuing 
decline—if the prospect of calamity is not removed—there will      
inevitably be yet another action, individual or collective, predatory or 
communal, and ultimately constructive or parasitic. As long as       
immiseration shows no sign of ending, there will be fresh efforts by 
those impacted to stem the tide of destitution, including a full measure 
of collective effort.  
 The logic of occupation contains an assumption that the    
indigenous population will eventually accept the reality of their       
situation without further resistance. This assumption rests on the   
indisputable longevity of many oppressive regimes—including the 
survival of the predecessor regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan (though 
the Taliban were famously unable to fully pacify the country). This 
longevity raises the question of why neither the Iraqis nor the Afghans 
lapsed into the same passivity after the U.S.-led invasion that had 
characterized their ultimate reaction to the Hussein and Taliban     
regimes.  
 The tenacity of the resistance to the U.S.-imposed regimes in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (and to other regimes similarly imposed) derives 
from the pacification/immiseration cycle, which created a dynamic 
quite different from the predecessor regimes. While both the Hussein 
and Taliban regimes generated immiseration over the course of their 
reign, it was neither uniform nor relentless, as the process imposed by 
the U.S. has been. For the most part, oppression of various sectors 
occurred in large and sudden bursts, followed by periods of stability 
or even progress, so that certain sectors of society or regions of the 
country experience immiseration at any given time. This sort of     
pulsing oppression generates ample protest, but it tends to be        
concentrated in the targeted areas, with other regions or social       
segments remaining quiescent. The entrenched regime can the focus 
its attention on the rebellious areas, and utilize its established          
institutions to suppress the resistance.  
 The transformative agenda integral to military humanism 
practiced by the United States does not allow for this strategy of     
suppression. In the first instance, the transformational goals, enacted 
at the national level as the occupation begins, guarantees that         
immiseration will impact large segments of the country                  
simultaneously, and thus assure widespread resistance and eventually 
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protest and even rebellion. The suppressive task is at least one      
magnitude greater than that faced by the Taliban or Hussein.  
 At the same time, the transformational goals require the     
annihilation of the existing government and its administrative        
apparatus. In destroying this structure, the occupation is depriving 
itself of a valuable tool for both anticipating and suppressing protest. 
Successful destruction of local administration leaves the occupation 
without a presence in the various communities, and therefore makes it 
hard to identify and liquidate either centers of resistance or indigenous 
counter-institutions.  
 Neither the Hussein regime nor the Taliban regime destroyed 
local structures when they ascended to power. Instead, they coopted 
the prior structure, attempting to make them agents of their rule. This 
process of cooptation was feasible precisely because neither were   
intent on replacing the existing infrastructure or revolutionize life at 
the local level. When they did institute changes, they did so piecemeal 
and gradually.  
 In Iraq, the policies enacted by Hussein that created the     
dynamics of immiseration did indeed generate rebellion, though he 
was far more effective than the United States in suppressing it. His 
effectiveness flowed from the national government’s administrative     
presence in virtually all localities, which could identify the sources of 
opposition and support to the regime’s policies, and enact responses 
suited to the nature of the threat. Only in Kurdistan was his apparatus 
inadequate to the task, and these provinces eventually established 
meaningful autonomy that made further depredations impractical. In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban was less successful, they could never        
integrate many provinces which remained under the rule of the war 
lords of Northern Alliance.  
 By annihilating the existing government in both countries, the 
U.S.-led occupation deprived itself of the key tools for controlling 
resistance, the tools that both the Taliban and Hussein regimes       
utilized to suppress rebellion in various locations. Once rebellion   
began—in far more areas than the predecessor regimes had faced—
the only tool of suppression was the application of overwhelming  
firepower by the U.S. military, a device guaranteed to generate further 
resistance.  
 The denouement of this element in the pacification cycle is 
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that the absence of a viable government apparatus assures room to 
maneuver for the resistance, no matter how poorly organized it might 
be. Once the pressure of the military is relieved (and often, even    
before), the absence of a viable governmental apparatus provides two 
resources to the resistance. In the first instance, it allows space for 
reconstruction efforts to be developed without interference, and in 
the second instance, credit for any progress cannot be claimed by the 
occupation, which has no presence.  
 At the end of each cycle, the community finds that it was the 
resistance, not the occupation, which answered their needs, even if 
only in the most meager way. In Iraq, the siphoning of oil, fought for 
and won by the resistance, vivified the local economy (in sharp      
contrast to the immiseration offered by the occupation) if only      
because the proceeds were spent in the local community, but also if 
they are applied to social endeavors, as they often were. In             
Afghanistan, the resistance nurtured the opium crop and generated 
income for local farmers, while the occupation destroyed their        
livelihood. In the face of this pattern, the resistance tended to gain 
legitimacy within the communities. And when the resistance failed to 
provide amelioration, the next cycle produced a new chance or a new 
type of resistance. 
 As time elapses, the occupation must experience declining 
legitimation. Its kinetic operations produce increased anger and      
rebellion, thus undermining the credibility of the occupation as a     
military force. Its reconstruction operations contribute to               
immiseration, thus undermining its credibility as a positive economic 
force. Over time the legitimacy shifts away from the regime, either to 
an increasingly coherent opposition, or towards the various local    
efforts that log partial successes.   
 
PART VI - CONCLUSION 
 Oppressive regimes, like those that preceded the U.S.         
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, remain in power based upon the 
judicious application of violence. By targeting one sector of society for 
immiseration or suppression, while leaving others (temporarily or    
permanently) unaffected, the resistance can be isolated and contained, 
if not suppressed. This sort of selectivity must, in some large way, rely 
on a kind of conservatism, in which the structures and arrangements 
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under which most people live remained intact most of the time. This 
sort of conservatism creates a kind of stability that even the most   
violently oppressive regime requires if it is to avoid generalized       
disruption and rebellion. In its essence, it avoids a generalized spiral of 
immiseration that extends into diverse regions and communities.  
 The U.S. project in the Middle East, to ‘reshape the culture of 
the Islamic world,’ required a wholesale transformation of the host 
societies (Hastings 2010). However appealing that might be to those 
who saw Iraq and Afghanistan as wholly corrupt or dysfunctional   
societies, such wholesale transformation implies an immiseration    
process reaching into every nook and cranny of the host country.  
 It is precisely the ambitiousness of the goals that guarantees 
that resistance would extend across otherwise important divisions 
and—at least on occasion—unite large numbers of otherwise        
dispersed groupings, fractions, and classes into generalized resistance. 
In seeking to suppress the disruptive or violent collective resistance, 
the absence of viable government and the presence of a powerful   
military produce the often-spectacular degradation of the pacification 
cycle. At some point, the most visible aspects of this cycle—most   
often population displacement and refugee flows into neighboring 
countries—activate the human rights regime. Under certain physical 
and political circumstances the plight of the people enmeshed in this 
cycle may receive the publicity consonant with an internationally     
recognized humanitarian crisis.  
 The never-ending struggle over oil in Iraq illustrated this    
process. The U.S. project to transfer control to international oil    
companies immediately mobilized the cadre of technicians and      
bureaucrats whose jobs depended on the continued viability of the 
state-owned oil companies they worked in or presided over. Very 
quickly, it mobilized the workers in the oil and related industries, who 
perceived the threat of foreign workers to their jobs. It mobilized local 
leaders, who sought to defend the custom of local siphoning, which 
would disappear under foreign control. And so it went. Ultimately, the 
protest percolated outward and upward, including violent attacks on 
pipelines and oil construction projects, and parliamentary opposition 
to enabling legislation.  
 In the meantime, the occupation military used kinetic     
methods in an attempt to suppress the resistance and impose a set of 
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economic reforms that sought to supplant local structures (such as 
siphoning). The combined consequences of these struggles deepened 
the immiseration, rendering local areas incapable of supporting the 
lives of their residents (as in Fallujah), and triggered the displacement 
that most typically sounds the alarums of the human rights regime.  
 Similarly, the problem of water purity spread immiseration 
from one sector to another as its impact extended into far corners of 
Iraqi society. As it did so, it mobilized various segments in various 
ways. Fishing boats were idled and their crews set about searching for 
jobs and protesting their unemployment, farmers sought remedies and 
ultimately migrated to cities searching for new work, while calling for 
restoration of the water. Consumers, deprived of affordable products 
and forced to buy imports, began demanding state support to handle 
inflated prices. The protests triggered military suppression and further 
degradation of local life, leading to shifting targets and changing     
tactics. In 2009, the Shia and Sunni communities—only recently     
separated by religious and ethnic divisions that had generated massive 
ethnic cleansing—coalesced around eliminating electrical shortages as 
a solution to water contamination and other problems. In 2010, the 
protests involving an estimated one million people had reached     
upward to the national government, extracting a promise of using oil 
revenues to reconstruct the government-operated electrical grid,    
abandoning the U.S.-imposed commitment to privatization.  
 The underlying diversity of the discontent and the absence of 
national administration in the public or civil sectors assures that most 
collective action will be local, but the evolution and dynamics of     
continuous organizing also guarantees moments of coordination when 
many sectors coalesce around specific or more general issues—even 
after damaging internecine warfare. This coalescence may be         
temporary or relatively durable, successful or unsuccessful. It may 
appear in one form and then another. For a time, in Iraq there was a 
huge and very visible insurgency. At other times, electoral protest was 
the primary form of expression. Still other times, various localities 
sought to operate almost as city-states, seeking to autonomously     
deliver specific reconstitutive programs to their residents.  
 The generalized discontent produced by these pacification/
immiseration cycles at least sometimes percolates into all the durable 
and temporary structures of the host society. Despite the best efforts 
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of the U.S. occupation to construct compliant client regimes, even the 
most docile leaders find themselves buffeted by the demands of the 
always-developing institutions they must rely on in order to govern, 
and through them the percolated demands of ordinary citizens. In 
Iraq, President Nouri al-Maliki faced a Parliament that had become a 
center of resistance to the oil laws that the U.S. advocated. The oil 
ministry, partly in defense of its own institutional power and partly in 
response to the voices from diverse segments of the population, 
sought contracts with oil companies that did not transfer decision-
making over development and production to the global market. The 
electrical ministry extracted a promise of billions of oil money to    
rebuild the old electrical grid, abandoning the U.S. program of        
privatizing the electrical industry into the hands of multinational     
corporations.  
 In Afghanistan, a similar process also took hold. Starting with 
the re-institutionalization of sexism, President Karzai became        
increasingly responsive to internal demands contradictory to U.S. 
preferences. His pursuit of negotiations with the Taliban was a key 
element in his evolution toward independence. 
 Resistance to the transformative project initiated by the    
United States and initially imposed by the military was continuous 
within both countries from the beginning of the occupation. The 
forms it took and the demands it made migrated from one node to 
another, ebbing and flowing according to the complex rhythm created 
by the pacification/immiseration cycles, and the response by the    
multitude of sectors impacted by them. What is inevitable is that the 
resistance will be constantly renewed, rebuilt and rejuvenated for as 
long as the transformative project is pressed; and that the conflict will 
continue until the occupation is ended or the transformative project 
abandoned.  
 Ultimately, the goal of marrying military conquest and       
economic transformation is doomed not just to failure, but to         
generate humanitarian crisis and endless rebellion.  
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Endnotes 
1. See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman’s seminal work, Globalization: The Human 
Consequences (1998). See also Shaw (2001). The widely read Globalization Reader, 
now in its third edition, utilizes this typology to organize key readings in the field 
(Lechner and Boli, 2009).  
2. For a particularly eloquent treatment of communication and transportation, see 
Bauman, Chapter 1.  
3. Even in Zygmunt Bauman’s admirable synthetic effort (1998), various               
elements are treated in separate chapters with sparse but illuminating connecting 
analyses.  
4. For important reviews of neoliberal globalization processes, see Harvey (2003, 
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2006) and Smith (2005). For careful (and in some ways contrasting) treatments 
of neoliberalism as a guiding ideology, see Klein (2007) and Dodge (2006, 2009, 
2010). Beck (2000) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) offer insight on        
neoliberalism as a theory. Peck and Tickell (2002) offer a particularly lucid     
review of the various (and often contrasting) ways that neoliberal theory has 
been enacted into policy in various national settings.  
5. For a persuasive argument that warmaking itself has become globalized, see 
Shaw (2005, especially Chapter 3).  
6. For various treatments of the history and current profile of military intervention 
see Downes (2006, 2007a, 2007b), Duffield (2001), Finnemore (2003), Harris 
(2003, 2003), Kaldor (2007), Shaw (2001, 2005), Valentino et al. (2004),        
Wallerstein (2003). For a critique of the Clausewitzian interpretation of modern 
interventions, see Shaw (2005:40-1). 
7. For a vivid history of several recent humanitarian crises, see Polman (2010)  
8. For a definition of international regimes, see Krasner, 1982, as well as the special 
issue of International Organization which his essay introduces. For analyses of the 
origins and dynamics of international human rights regimes, see Donnelly 1986, 
2006. For details of the United Nations contribution, see Mingst and Karns 
2007. For discussion of human rights groups and social movements, see Weist 
and Smith, 2012 (forthcoming).  
9. For important analyses of these dynamics, see Harvey (2003, 2006), Wood 
(2003), Smith (2005), Klein (2007).  
10. For various treatments of the transnational capitalist class, with or without this 
label, see Robinson and Harris (2000), Harris (2001, 2011), Sklair (2001), Harvey 
(2003), Bauman (1998).  
11. For analyses of how these global institutions impact state and economic policies,  
and the collateral consequences on the host countries see Klein, 2007, Wade 
(2004), Stiglitz (2003). For assessments of impact on particular sectors, see    
Shandra et al. (2011) on forests, Kim et al. (2002) on health.  
12. Much of the literature on such interventions has sought to evaluate its efficacy. 
For useful work on this subject, see Downes (2007a, 2007b, 2008), Fortna 
(2003).  
13. See for example Bjork (2010), Duffield (2001), Harris (2002, 2003, 2011), Harvey 
(2003), Springborg et al. (2007), Wallerstein (2003).  
14. See also Harris, 2003, Wallerstein 2003, Dodge, 2006; Klein 2008; Schwartz 
2009, among many others.  
15. Bjork took the Powell quote from Hamden (2004). See also Sanchez (2008). For 
details on the Falluja battle, see Schwartz (2008, Ch. 7).  
16. See also Dodge (2009, 2010). 
17. For reviews of the origins and development of the human rights regime, see 
Krasner (1982), Donnelly (1986, 2010); Buergenthal (1997); Mingst and Karns 
(2007, Ch. 4, 6), Kuperman (2009a, 2010); Nash (2009), Polman (2010: 1-11).  
18. Many analyses do not distinguish between SMOs and human rights NGOs, with 
some reviews grouping both under the broader rubric of civil society (e.g., 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005)), while others include only NGOs (adopting 
neutral or non-partisan stances while focusing on monitoring and service      
delivery) in the HRR (e.g., Kuperman (2009a). A growing body of literature, 
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however, asserts the need for a separate analysis of activist SMOs engaging in 
contentious politics aimed at policy and social change, distinguishing them from 
NGOs adopting a neutral and/or non-partisan stance toward domestic or     
international government (Smith (2008); Smith and Weist (2012)).  
19. The literature on transnational SMOs is less codified. For information on SMOs 
as part of the human rights regime, see Keck and Sikkink (1998); Smith (2008); 
Smith and Weist (2012). For information on the World Social Forum and other 
meta-movements, see Fisher and Ponniah (2003), Santos (2006), Smith et al. 
(2007). For discussion of the efficacy of SMOs (as well as broader civil society 
efforts), see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), Nash (2009). For an insightful 
data driven analysis of how SMOs work within the HRR to effect change, see 
Tsutsui and Shin’s investigation of the Korean minority’s struggle to acquire 
human rights in Japan (2006). 
20. Mingst and Karns (2007: 93-108). See also Finnemore (2003); Bass (2008). 
21. Among the significant contributions to the scholarship on humanitarian military 
intervention are Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003), Finnemore (2003: particularly 
Chapter 3) and Bass (2008). Useful citations to this literature can be found in 
Mingst and Karns (2007: Chapter 4, especially p. 112n37). On R2P, see ICISS 
(2001), Kuperman (2009b). For a list of UN sponsored interventions since the 
1990s, see Kuperman (2009b: 19-20), Donnelly (2006: 14), Mingst and Karns 
(2007: 98). For a review of the literature, and a persuasive argument that      
peacekeeping and peacebuilding were often successful in forestalling renewed 
hostilities, see Fortna (2003).  
22. Finnemore (2003) traces the beginning of modern military intervention to India’s 
1971 intervention in the region of Pakistan that would ultimately become     
Bangladesh, carried out under the banner of protecting civilians from human 
rights violations by Pakistan’s army. In Finnemore’s analysis, this instance and 
other unilateral interventions in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Tanzania in Uganda 
and Vietnam in Cambodia) were not ‘legitimate in contemporary politics’     
because ‘humanitarian intervention must be multilateral.’ See also Kuperman 
(2009a) and Duffield (2001: 57).  
23. Quotations are from Fennimore (2003: 136, 135); see also Barnett and           
Finnemore, 1999. For an elaboration of this argument, arguing that the coupling 
of security and human rights is part of a larger globalized nexus including     
neoliberal economic development, see Duffield (2001: Chapter 3, especially pp. 
51f).  
24. For a useful list and discussion up to 2001, seen Fennimore (2003: 138-9).  
25. See, for example, Kuperman (2009a, 2009b), Donnelly (1986), Nash (2011), and 
Mingst and Karnes (2005: Chapter 5).  
26. See also Betts (1994), Shaw (2005: 91f), Kuperman and Crawford (2006),      
Kuperman (2010).  
27. There is no satisfactory definition of military intervention, as distinguished from 
other kinetic military action, including war. See Finnemore for a useful treatment 
of this ambiguity (2003: Chapter 1). 
28. Key works in this area include Schelling (1966), Pape (1996), Carr (2002), Asprey 
(2004), Valentino (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Downes (2008). For a good 
entry point into this literature, see Downes (2007b), which introduces a special 
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issue of Civil Wars (volume 9, no. 4, December 2007), containing key             
contributions, as well as references to much of the literature up to that time. See 
also Arreguin-Toft (2001, especially notes 26-31). For a review and analysis of 
civilian targeting by the United States, see Tirman (2011).  
29. See Downes (2006, 2007a) for statements of the applicability of this work to 
humanitarian interventions.  
30. See also Downes (2007a, 2007b) 
31. Arreguin-Toft (2001: 101). According to Arreguin-Toft, ‘Historically, the most 
common forms of barbarism include the murder of noncombatants (e.g.,       
prisoners of war or civilians during combat operations); the use of concentration 
camps; and since 1939, strategic bombing against targets of no military value.’ 
32. Shaw (2005) interprets the civilian casualties in these wars as a byproduct of the 
commitment of the United States and its allies to minimize casualties to its own 
troops.  
33. Even though human rights concerns were offered as a part of the vocabulary of 
motives for the three focal interventions, Nash sees the interventions themselves 
as motivated by Realpolitik, with the human rights violations a byproduct of 
actions taken ‘on the basis of ‘raison d’etat’ concerning security and access to 
resources.’  
34. Duffield (2001: especially Chapters 3-5) offers a sustained argument that         
post-Soviet humanitarian intervention has adopted economic development as a 
primary goal, resting this transformational intention on the belief that without 
development, the host society will return to its pre-intervention patterns.  
35. Modern history is filled with economically motivated military action, including 
the overthrow of local regimes poised to nationalize foreign-owned industries 
(e.g., Guatemala, 1954) and the use of military invasion to collect debts owed to 
foreign investors (e.g., Nicaragua, Morocco and Turkey in the 1870s). However, 
these aimed at changing government policies vis-à-vis various economic interests 
and did not seek to directly intervene in economic activity (Finnemore, 2003: 
Chapter 2). For a detailed catalogue and description of U.S. military              
interventions since World War II, together with their economic purposes and 
consequences, see Blum (2008). 
36. Petraeus (2009: 16), emphasis added. For a similar commitment, enunciated by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, see Clinton (2010).  
37. See Part I above for the traditional view of military intervention. See also,                
Finnemore (2003: Chapter 4) for an account of the changes in the vision and 
purpose of military intervention over the past two centuries.  
38. For comprehensive treatments of this history, see Klare (2005), Engler (2008), 
Achcar (2006), Hiro (2007), Ali (2003), Schwartz (2008).  
39. These themes first appeared in National Security Strategy in 2002 (NSC, 2002), 
as quoted in Juhasz (2006:44). See also, Engler (2008: 40-2).  
40. For an important analysis of the differences between Middle East state-directed 
development (and also, China, India, and Russia) and the policies associated with 
neoliberalism, see Harris (2009).  
41. For an extended discussion of the melding of military, humanist and neoliberal 
goals during the 1990s, see Duffield (2001: Chapters 3-5). Duffield does not, 
however, anticipate the military-primacy aspect of U.S. policy after 9-11. See also 
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Part I, above.  
42. In late 2008, the Bush Administration negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement 
with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn by December 
31, 2011. It was this commitment that Petraeus (and subsequent Obama      
Administration documents and actions) referenced in discussing the long term 
role of the U.S. military in Iraq, including frequent gestures towards modifying 
the SOFA to extend the military presence there (see Schwartz, 2010; Healy and 
Schmidt, 2011).  
43. This reference to continued influence evokes Bjork’s (2010) image of punitive 
wars as efforts to extend sovereignty. 
44. General Petraeus had literally, in 2006, ‘written the book’ on counterinsurgency 
(Petraeus and Amos, 2006).  
45. Krasner is also an influential International Relations scholar, the Graham H. 
Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, before and 
after his service at State.  His concept of shared sovereignty complements 
Bjork’s (2010) argument that punitive wars are fought in regions of contested 
sovereignty.  
46. In his formulation of shared sovereignty, Krasner argues that it is most useful 
when the host government lacks legitimacy, and the successful implementation 
of new policy is carried forward by a more capable outside partner. This       
dovetails with Bundt’s expectation that U.S. primacy in the planning and       
implementation process of an ultimately successful endeavor would ‘augment 
the legitimacy’ of the Iraqi government (Krasner, 2005: 70-2).  
47. The unwillingness of the State Department to depend upon Iraqi police and 
military for this protection was symptomatic of their lack of faith in the         
competence of these forces and/or their lack of coverage in the many locations 
that Embassy-headquartered agencies operated in. Beyond these sources of      
dis-confidence lay the deeper suspicion, prevalent from the early days of the 
occupation, that Iraqi forces, even those supplied, trained, and supervised by 
U.S. officers, were unwilling to fight to protect personnel from—or employed 
by—the U.S. occupation.  
48. Ellick (2010). U.S. officials justified their close supervision of their aid          
expenditures as a necessary measure to control corrupt contractors.  
49. For treatments and analyses of neoliberal globalization and its discontents, see 
Wood (2003), Harvey (2003, 2007), Smith (2005), Klein (2007), Schwartz (2008), 
and Engler (2008).  
50. For a pointed and insightful treatment of the contrast and friction between state-
centered capitalism in the Middle East (and in China and Russia) and neoliberal 
capitalism captained by the U.S., see Harris (2009).  
51. On Chile, see Klein (2007). On Russia, see Stiglitz (2000) and Kagarlitsky (2002). 
On Argentina, see Perry and Serven (2002) and Schamis (2002).  
52. Schwartz (2008: Ch. 3). For the demobilization of the military, see Ricks (2006: 
Ch.8, especially 158-65). For the destruction of state administrative capacity, see 
Brinkley (2007). For relevant documents, see Ehrenberg et al. (2010). The best 
account of the early economic policies of the CPA can be found in Naomi Klein 
(2004). See also Klein (2007:Part 6), Chatterjee (2004, especially pp. 175-182), 
Docena (2005, 2006), Juhasz (2004, 2006). 
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53. Crane and Terrill (2003: iv); quoted in Shaw (2005:112).  
54. The neo-conservatives, who spoke most forcefully about destroying indigenous 
regimes, were particularly vociferous on the subject of Saudi Arabia, despite its 
long term alliance with the United States, dating back to the end of World War 
II. See, for example, the forceful analysis of Reuel Marc Gerecht (2004). Gerecht 
was a director of the Project for a New American Century, a policy formation 
organization that sent key personnel (including Cheney, Rumsfeld, and          
Wolfowitz) to the George W. Bush administration.  
55. In Afghanistan, the various warlords allied with NATO maintained significant 
administrative capacity in their domains; in Iraq, indigenous leadership had    
effectively governed the Kurdish provinces, under the protection of the U.S.-led 
‘no fly zone.’ Only meager administrative remnants remained intact in the    
Pashtun territory of Afghanistan and the Shia and Sunni areas of Iraq. For Iraq, 
see Rosen (2006a) and Jamail (2007). For Afghanistan, see Jones (2006a), Suhrke 
(2007, 2008).  
56. For a detailed account of this process in Iraq, see Schwartz (2008).  
57. When theorists of war refer to Iraq and Afghanistan, they distinguish between 
the initial conventional wars, which ended rather quickly, from the period of 
‘post conflict,’ in which ‘political and social reconstruction’ was primary (Crane 
and Terrill, 2003:11; Shaw, 2005: 113). In earlier wars, this distinction worked 
well, because the initial battles were followed by a longer or shorter period of 
dramatically less violence. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the preponderance 
of the fighting, casualties, and infrastructural disruption took place after the 
conventional war had ended and the anticipated phase of reconstruction had 
begun.  
58. For vivid accounts of these on-the-ground military actions in Iraq, see Rosen 
(2006a), Jamail (2007), and Tirman (2011). See also Schwartz (2008). For      
descriptions and statistics in Afghanistan, see Gall (2011).  
59. See, for example, the battles in Habaniya, Baiji and on Haifa Street in Baghdad 
(Schwartz, 2008).  
60. For useful descriptions of the brutality and immiseration of targeted families and 
communities in Afghanistan, see Gall (2011). For Iraq, see Tirman (2011)  
61. The elaborate field manual for applying counterinsurgency strategy was written 
by Petraeus and James F. Amos (2006). The publication of this manual heralded 
the revival of COIN, long dormant after the defeat in Vietnam had discredited it, 
but revitalized by its application in Iraq, and subsequently institutionalized as 
Petraeus (the co-author) rose in stature due to his position as Iraq commander 
during the period when levels of violence declined precipitously. When Obama 
appointed Petraeus as commander of CENTCOM, the new commanding     
general announced the application of COIN to Afghanistan as his major military 
initiative. See also Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 213-236).  
62. Hastings (2010). Macgregor saw this effort as hopeless: ‘The entire COIN      
strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people…. The idea that we are 
going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is 
utter nonsense.’  
63. See Polman (2010) and Jones (2006a) for the virtues and dangers of this       
approach.  
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64. For the philosophical underpinnings of this stance, see Doyle (1983a, 1983b, 
1986).  
65. Duffield (2001:103). The internal quote refers to a European Commission policy 
document (EC, 1996). 
66. Chandrasekaran, 2010, see also Whitlock, 2010. A not insignificant element in 
the creation of ‘this bleeding ulcer’ was conceded by the U.S. military later in 
2010: two official reports estimated that at least 80% of those arrested during the 
surge (and perhaps an equal proportion of those killed), had not been Taliban 
activists or insurgents of other complexions. These arrests then became a part of 
the culture of resistance, demonstrating to locals that avoiding involvement in 
resistance would not make them safe from the kinetic attacks by the NATO 
occupation (Porter Crane and Terrill (2003:44, see also18, 20,23, 31, 42f, 63f)).  
67. Even American military officers publicly conceded an increase in ‘violence,’ 
marking the May 2011 level as 15% above a year earlier (Filkins, 2011).  
68. For exceptions to this pattern, see Suhrke (2007, 2008), Finnemore (2003), 
Dodge (2010), Tirman (2011) and Part I above.  
69. For a parallel scholarly treatment of the military role in pre-1990 wars, see       
Kaldor (2007: Chapters 2-3). Kaldor offers a particularly detailed and                  
informative analysis of military-civilian relationships in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
intervention (Chapter 3).  
70. Crane and Terrill ((2003:44, see also18, 20, 23, 31, 42f, 63f). Astore and        
Engelhardt (2011) argue that this version of military-primacy has become the 
defining feature of U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century. 
71. See also Kaldor’s detailed consideration of the negative impact of the Iraq war 
(2007: Chapter 7) on human rights in Iraq. She does not focus on the non-
kinetic aspects of the military role.  
72. It is worth noting that Marja and other surge-created ‘build’ projects involved 
few of the mainstays of the human rights regime. This was partly an expression 
of the military-primary policy, which placed emphasis on direct participation of 
military personnel or the use of capitalist subcontractors in roles regularly played 
by the HRR; it was partly a reflection of the ongoing fighting that made the sites 
too dangerous for unprotected human rights workers; and it was partly an     
unwillingness of many NGOs to participate in projects that would compromise 
their stance of neutrality by aligning them with the occupation. See Jones (2006a, 
2006b, 2009, 2010), Polman (2010).  
73. For an analysis of the parallel problems in Iraq, see Klein (2007), Schwartz 
(2008).  
74. For an insightful discussion of the role of opium cultivation in the post-911 
Afghan economy, see Jones (2006b) 
75. This account, including all quotes, is taken from Gall and Khapalwak (2011). For 
a more general analysis of the role of road building in Afghanistan, see Tirman 
(2011: 275).  
76. These ambitions were reported by New York Times reporters Gall and Khapalwak 
(2011), based on interviews with Canadian military officers commanding troops 
in the Kandahar region. 
77. A substantial proportion of this cost reflected the decrepit condition of the   
infrastructure before the U.S. attack, a result of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, 
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the UN-endorsed Gulf War in 1990, the draconian sanctions imposed on Iraq in 
the 1990s, and the corruption of the Hussein regime ( Schwartz, 2008: Part I).  
78. This account is based on Chatterjee (2004, 2009), Jamail (2007), and Schwartz 
(2008, Part III). 
79. On Iraq, see Chatterjee (2004, 2009) and Miller (2006). On Afghanistan, see 
Jones (2009, 2010).  
80. Jones 2010; see also Jones, 2009. Internal reference is to Clinton (2010). On Iraq, 
see Chatterjee (2004, 2009).  
81. An examplar of the relationship between occupation and indigenous corruption 
can be seen in the 2011 findings of a British Parliamentary investigation        
identifying 21 billion pounds of development money ‘squandered’ by the U.S. 
government. Included in the lost money was the $900 million in the Kabul Bank 
scandal, making the predominant instance of Afghan corruption a tiny fraction 
of the overall losses by the United States (Famer, 2011; Gutcher, 2011; Jelinek, 
2011).   
82. See, for example, the experiences of Chile, Argentina, the countries of the             
former Soviet Union, and other settings in which a sitting government enacted 
neoliberal policies without the mediation of outside military intervention. In 
most of these settings, multinational investors found profitable investments, 
though these projects did not usually result in immediate or long term benefits 
for the indigenous population.  
83. This account is based on Chatterjee (2004), Docena (2005, 2006); Klein (2004, 
2007: Ch 17); Schwartz (2008), Juhasz (2004, 2006).  
84. For Bremer’s orders relating to privatization, see Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 198-
200). For a USAID document expressing the logic behind this policy, see     
Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 400-2).  
85. This account in based on Schwartz (2008: Ch. 4) and Juhasz (2006: Ch. 7). For 
the definitive account of oil economics and politics in post-Hussein Iraq, see 
Muttitt (2011).  
86. For Hague Convention documents rendering Bremer’s actions illegal, see     
Ehrenberg et al. (2010: 168-9, 295-7).  
87. In 2009, major international oil companies finally began signing development 
contracts with the Iraqi government, but they did not approach the terms that 
Bremer had originally offered. If enacted as written, the oil development       
contracts would strengthen the Iraqi government and permit it to re-establish the 
sort of economic control that the Hussein regime had maintained, thus   defeat-
ing the long term U.S. goal of opening and transforming it into an outpost for 
globalized markets. But even in this context, the actual investment had not yet 
been activated, as the oil companies paused to determine if their investment was 
secure. See Schwartz (2010). 
88. This confidence rested mainly on Kurdish regional government’s ten-year     
control over its three-province domain. This stability had been established soon 
after the 1990 Gulf War, when it declared its autonomy from the Hussein     
regime, defending it with the help of the United States imposed ‘no fly zone’ that 
had protected it from Hussein regime aerial offensives (see Schwartz, 2008: Part 
IV).  
89. On collective responses to natural disasters, see Solnit (2009), Clarke (2002); 
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Erickson (1995). 
90. This account is taken from Schwartz (2008: Chapters 14-17). 
91. In the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, the dominant force was loosely or tightly 
connected to the Taliban, though the reconstituted Taliban was somewhat    
different in theory and practice from its power-holding predecessor.   
92. This argument is based on material found in Polman (2010), Nash (2009),     
Duffield (2002: Chapters 3-4), Kuperman (2009a), Jones (2011).  
93. For a vivid account of the meager successes of the HRR in Afghanistan after the 
U.S. invasion, see Jones (2006a).  
94. Unless otherwise noted, this account is taken from Chatterjee (2009), Muttitt 
(2011) and Schwartz (2006b, 2008: Chapter 4).  
95. This account is based on Cole (2007), Jamail (2007), Rosen (2006a:130-45, 
2006b), Schwartz (2006a, 2006c; 2008:104-114, 240-268),  
96. On the number of insurgent attacks over the years, see Brookings (2009).  
97. This account is based on Schwartz (2008, Chapter 18).  
98. This account is based on Hirsh and Barry (2005), Jamail (2006: 244-7); Schwartz 
(2008: 210-16; 245-63). For background on the Latin American origins of U.S. 
death squad development, see Grandin (2007). 
99. Jones (2006b, 2009); because of this nexus the Karzai regime had formally re-
adopted many of the previously abolished forms of institutional sexism (Borger, 
2009). 
100. On Iraq, see Ali (2003). On Afghanistan, see Jones (2006a). 
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